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This article analyses the recent rulings from the European Court of Justice in two Danish cases and 
examines their possible impact on international tax avoidance. These rulings regard limitations of tax 
benefits related to cross-border dividends and interest payments resulting from the interposition of 
holding companies in the EU. We conclude that from a legal perspective, the rulings demonstrate 
the alignment of international tax policies to combat tax avoidance between the EU and the OECD. 
This alignment is historical in international tax law as it encompasses a record-high number of states 
and because it introduces a minimum standard of tools to combat tax treaty abuse directly into 
national state legislation. This could be the end for certain tax-motivated structures of international 
companies. From a quantitative perspective, the conclusion is that the rulings limit the potential for 
Multinational Enterprises to lower their tax burden considerably. The worldwide average potential 
gain from treaty shopping is reduced by 1.1 percentage points from 5.6% to 4.5% when the EU 
member states cannot be used on treaty shopping routes. With more countries, and treaties, 
involved, the combat against tax avoidance is more effective. However, the fact that some countries 
have a standard withholding tax rate of zero percent hampers the combat. If a prohibitive penalty is 
applied on indirect routes to all partner countries, the policy is much more effective. The gains from 
treaty shopping all but disappear in such a setting. 
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1  Introduction 
 
Several international initiatives aim to combat tax evasion and avoidance. Recently, the playing field 
changed considerably with two preliminary rulings, dated 26 February 2019, from the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (hereafter the “CJEU”). These rulings caused considerable turmoil in 
the world of international fiscal advisory practice. We argue that these rulings are a game-changer in 
tax-motivated structuring of international groups. 
 
The rulings, in the so-called “Danish beneficial ownership cases” (hereafter “the Danish BO cases”), 
regarded the exemption of withholding taxes based on the Parent-Subsidiary Directive (hereafter 
the “PSD”) and the Interest and Royalty Directive (hereafter the “IRD”) in abusive situations. These 
EU directives allow for the tax-free distribution of dividends, royalties or interest between two EU 
member states when certain conditions are met. The Danish tax authorities argued in the cases that 
the directives did not apply, and the tax exemption was denied because the relevant payments 
eventually ended up in third, non-EU countries, rendering the interposed EU holding companies 
mere conduits. The cases were referred by the Danish national courts to the CJEU with a request for 
a preliminary ruling to establish the interpretation of the EU law in order for the national courts to 
make the correct decision in the end.  
 
The rulings represent a landmark in the combat against tax avoidance in EU law4, as they provide 
guidelines for estimating situations of abuse, in which the advantages of the PSD and the IRD should 
be disallowed. This inspired us to address two research questions in this article. The first has a legal 
perspective: Can the direction of the rulings be understood or even defended having regard to the 
recent development in international tax policies in the EU and the OECD? And if so, where is the line 
drawn by the cases to disentangle abusive behaviour from valid economic activity eligible for the 
advantages in EU tax law? This distinction implies an economic test determining whether the tax 
benefits for the taxpayers are sufficiently outweighed by other business benefits for them in a given 
arrangement.5 
 
We conclude that the rulings represent a clear alignment of the policies to combat tax avoidance 
within the EU and the OECD. Furthermore, the rulings provide some guidelines to disentangle abusive 
behaviour from valid economic activity eligible for advantages according to EU directives and DTTs, 
which is also an indication of the worldwide impact of the rulings. It is clear that the economic test 
conducted to draw this line both affects the overall potential for treaty shopping, as it is envisaged in 
the OECD BEPS project, and for abusive behaviour, as it is envisaged in EU tax law, since it is based on 
factual patterns found in the Danish beneficial ownership cases. 
 
The second question has a quantitative perspective: Assuming such a test, can it be extended to 
provide a possible measure of the impact of the rulings on a larger scale than the cases alone? And if 
so, what will the impact be? For this assessment, we use the network analysis developed by van ‘t 
                                                   
4 See also J. Schwarz: Beneficial Ownership : CJEU Landmark Ruling, http://kluwertaxblog.com/2019/02/27/beneficial-ownership-cjeu-
landmark-ruling/ 
5 See also D. Bradbury, T. Hanappi and A. Moore, Estimating the fiscal effects of base erosion and profit shifting: data availability and analytical issues, 
UNCTAD Special Issue on Investment and International Taxation, Volume 25, Number 2, 2018, p. 98 
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Riet and Lejour (2018).6 With the network method, we can determine the ‘cheapest’ tax routes for 
dividend flows between 108 countries. Quite often, these are indirect routes via other (conduit) 
countries. We compute the maximum possible tax reduction that can be achieved by choosing the 
optimal routes over the network. In addition, we establish which countries are most central in the 
tax network, and hence, are most likely to perform the role of a conduit country. With a scenario 
analysis, we explore how these routes change if treaty shopping via Denmark is not possible any 
longer, i.e. if it had adopted an unilateral policy; what is the impact on the tax burden and the 
dividend flows via Denmark? Next, we analyse how the dividend flows are affected if the outcome of 
the cases is applied to the whole EU and also to all countries in the Inclusive Framework of the OECD 
BEPS project. 
 
The network analysis models the tax-optimising behaviour of Multinational Enterprises (hereafter 
"MNEs")7. However, the full potential of tax reduction is limited by legal rules. These rules are 
formulated in the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (hereafter “BEPS”) project to set up an 
international framework to combat tax avoidance by MNEs, and the EU Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive 
laying down rules against tax avoidance practices that directly affect the functioning of the internal 
market. The rulings (also “outcomes”) in the Danish cases are an example of the alignment of these 
two policies to combat tax avoidance, and further limit the possibilities for MNEs to optimise their 
tax structuring worldwide.  
 
We find that the rulings could limit the potential gains for MNEs to optimise their tax behaviour 
considerably. The worldwide average gain from treaty shopping is reduced by 1.1 percentage points 
from 5.6% to 4.5% when the EU member states apply their standard rates of the withholding taxes 
on indirect routes. When the compliant tax agreements of the Members of the Inclusive Framework 
on the OECD’s BEPS project also apply these standard rates, the treaty shopping gains are reduced 
by 1.4 percentage points. So the impact is sizeable, but only of significance if more countries apply 
the standard tax rates on outgoing dividends on indirect routes. If we only apply the outcomes of the 
Danish BO cases on Denmark itself, the position of Denmark as a conduit country on indirect routes 
is heavily affected. However, there are ample opportunities for using other indirect routes so that on 
average the treaty shopping gains do not diminish.  
 
In order to effectively combat treaty shopping, many countries have to implement the standard 
withholding tax rates, but this is not sufficient for eliminating treaty shopping. There are two reasons 
for this result. First, several countries have a zero withholding tax on dividends. In our sample of 108 
countries, we count 30 countries. If the EU countries apply a prohibitive penalty (also referred to as 
“p.p.”) instead of standard withholding tax rates, the gains of treaty shopping are reduced by 1.5 
percentage points compared to the baseline. For this purpose, “prohibitive” implies that the cost of 
using a certain country-country link as part of an indirect route is so high that it is effectively blocked 
for use on indirect routes. The difference with the standard withholding tax rates is that also links 
with a zero or low standard tax rate are no longer used on treaty shopping routes. However, also in 
                                                   
6 M. van’t Riet, and A. Lejour, 2018, Optimal Tax Routing: Network Analysis of FDI diversion, International Tax and Public Finance, October 
2018, Vol. 25:5, pp. 1321 – 1371. 
7 Whereas much of the discussion will apply to ‘taxpayers’  in general, i.e. to individuals and all legal persons, the network analysis 
concerns MNEs in particular as the bilateral treaty rates that are used are those for qualifying companies. The limitations to tax abuse 
following the rulings in the Danish cases apply in principle to all taxpayers and not just MNEs, but for the purpose of this paper, reference 
is made to the MNEs in particular.  
6 
 
this setting, the gains from treaty shopping are still sizable. They disappear if all OECD countries 
were to introduce the prohibitive penalty to all partner countries in the tax network; then treaty 
shopping becomes nearly non-existent. 
 
The OECD/G20 BEPS project is an important initiative in the combat of international tax avoidance, 
including Action 6, Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances.8 New 
OECD initiatives involve proposals for taxing the digitalized economy and a Global Anti-Base Erosion 
Proposal (“Globe”).9 This study re-emphasizes the inclusion of as many countries as possible to 
combat tax avoidance effectively. 
 
In the rest of the article, we first set out how we use the term ‘treaty shopping’ and we briefly 
discuss an economic perspective on withholding taxes. We present the two Danish cases involving 
the distribution of dividends in section 3,10 we discuss the outcomes of both cases, their history and 
contents. The rulings amount to an abuse test, weighing the tax benefits against other business 
benefits. Section 4 describes its characteristics and compares the outcomes with the rules in EU’s 
ATAD GAAR and the OECD Multilateral Convention. In section 4, also the tax benefits related to the 
two particular cases are estimated. The second part of the article emphasises the impact of the 
outcomes of these cases assuming they can be generalised. Section 5 describes our analytical tool, 
the network analysis. Section 6 presents the results of various scenarios and section 7 concludes.  
 
2  Treaty shopping and withholding taxes 
 
In the first part of the article, we discuss the legal arguments to determine whether certain holding 
structures constitute abusive situations in which, subsequently, treaty benefits must be denied. In 
the second, quantitative, part of the article, we examine the potential tax benefits for dividend 
distributions that may be obtained, worldwide, by treaty shopping. The term “treaty shopping” is 
used in the neutral sense of indirect routing. “Treaty shopping” thus is not to be understood as 
“treaty abuse” as the term “treaty shopping” for the purpose of this article is defined purely as “an 
attempt by a person to indirectly access the benefits of a tax agreement between two jurisdictions 
without being a resident of one of those jurisdictions”.11 This is more or less in line with the 
definition of van Weeghel (1998) as something that denotes “a situation in which a person who is 
not entitled to the benefits of a tax treaty makes use – in the widest meaning of the word – of an 
individual or legal person in order to obtain those treaty benefits that are not available directly.” If 
the said person had been a resident of one of the treaty jurisdictions, the treaty benefits would 
automatically apply.  
 
Double Tax Treaties aim to avoid or at least reduce double taxation. Tax treaty shopping is a method 
of paying less withholding taxes, making use of the lower agreed rates in the treaty instead of the 
higher standard rates. This may be financially and economically advantageous, not only for the 
individual or firm, but also for a jurisdiction. A lower tax burden increases profits and the return on 
                                                   
8 OECD, 2015 Preventing the Granting of treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6: 2015 Final report. 
9 OECD, 2019, Public Consultation Document.: Global Anti-Base Erosion Proposal (“GloBE”) -Pillar Two. 
10 The restriction to the dividend cases is because the network analysis, was only operational for dividend flows at the time. 
11 For a thorough discussion of the different aspects of treaty shopping, see S. van Weeghel: The Improper Use of Tax Treaties, Kluwer, 1998. 
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capital and could stimulate more investment and even employment. These economic effects have to 
be compared with other economic effects, such as higher, more distortive taxes on other tax bases. 
Withholding taxes on dividends determine, together with the corporate tax rate, the tax burden on 
capital income of shareholders. Although, ideally, this income would be taxed at the shareholder 
level, it is often taxed at the source. In most jurisdictions, the combined CIT and dividend tax burden 
is smaller than the tax burden on labour, but the differences are not that large. The lower tax burden 
on capital income follows from the more distortive nature of capital income taxation compared to 
labour income taxation due to its mobility.12 However, large differences between both tax burdens 
could create incentives for labelling labour income as capital income at the enterprise level, which is 
not efficient in the absence of such tax differences. 
 
So, there are a number of economic reasons that capital income should be sufficiently taxed, apart 
from the revenue motive in the source state13 including a withholding tax on dividends. In addition, 
the opportunities for avoiding withholding taxes seem to be larger for large multinational firms than 
for smaller firms, due to the associated costs and required expertise for treaty shopping. This could 
reduce the growth possibilities for smaller firms, and therefore hamper economic growth. 
 
There are also other factors in favour of withholding taxes. They are taxes on capital income and 
avoidance could have redistributive consequences which may not be in line with the societal 
preferences on redistribution. Finally, reducing double taxation may lead to double non-taxation, 
which, apart from the loss of revenues and distributional consequences, may affect the tax morale 
of the general public. Judging from the sometimes fierce responses to the recent media coverage 




                                                   
12 OECD, 2010,Tax Policy Study No. 20 - Tax Policy Reform and Economic Growth, Annex B. 
13 For a comprehensive overview of all efficiency and equity arguments for taxing capital income, see Jacobs, Bas, 2013, From Optimal Tax 
Theory to Applied Tax Policy", FinanzArchiv, 69, (3), 338-389. 
14 For a thorough analysis of the impact of this coverage, see S. Douma: Miscommunication and Distrust in the International Tax Debate, Wolters 
Kluwer, August 2018 and European Commission: Summary Record of the Meeting of the Platform for Tax Good Governance, Brussels, 12 
September 2018.  
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3 The cases  
 
The rulings in the Danish BO cases provide a new means of combatting tax avoidance for the EU 
member states by denying tax benefits in abusive situations. Furthermore, the rulings provide 
guidelines on how to disentangle abuse from real economic activity in practice, as the following 
sections will demonstrate.  
 
3.1  The outcome of the cases 
Originally, the cases were brought before the CJEU on 19 February 2016 by the High Courts of 
Denmark for a preliminary ruling. Almost two years later on 1 March 2018, the Advocate General15 
designated to the cases, AG Kokott, gave her opinion16, and almost three years later on 26 February 
2019, the CJEU handed down the preliminary rulings. The CJEU heard the cases in October 2017 
when the Court sat with 15 judges presided by the Court’s president. The fact that their composition 
went on beyond the change of judges at the CJEU in November 2018 speaks of the complexity and 
significance of the cases.17 
 
Moreover, given that the CJEU decided to provide a very different outcome than AG Kokott in her 
opinion from 2018, it is understandable that the outcome has been met with surprise and with a 
certain degree of scepticism18. If the CJEU had followed the opinion of AG Kokott in early 2018, the 
outcome of the cases would have been very different as she opined that the CJEU should maintain a 
hard line concerning the member states’ possibilities to deny benefits otherwise available in EU 
direct tax law. In other words: the outcome would have largely been in favour of the taxpayers19, 
whereas the final outcome instead provided the member states with a very potent weapon to fight 
certain legal business structures intended to obtain tax benefits. Consequently, the surprise factor 
has been significant and the outcry prompt, especially from tax advisers and academics20, and even 
the media has covered the cases and speculated that they could be a bomb for countries like the 
Netherlands, which has a history of hosting the conduit companies21 that enable the beneficial 
structures22.  
 
For the purpose of answering the first research question, the following sections will analyse the 
cases in the light of recent developments in international tax policies within the EU and the OECD.  
 
  
                                                   
15 The CJEU consists of a judge from each of the EU member states and 11 advocates general (AG). The role of the AG is to propose an 
independent legal solution in the form of an “opinion”. The CJEU is not obligated to follow the opinion delivered by the AG, but the 
opinion has an impact on the decision and is often followed.  
16 For a thorough analysis of AG Kokott’s opinion in the cases, see S. Baerentzen: Cross-Border Dividend and Interest Payments and Holding 
Companies – An Analysis of Advocate General Kokott’s Opinions in the Danish Beneficial Ownership Cases, European Taxation, August 2018, p. 343-353.  
17 See also, S. Baerentzen: Danish cases on the use of holding companies for cross-border dividends and interest – A new test to disentangle abuse from real 
economic activity? (forthcoming - under peer review) 
18 See e.g. W. Haslehner & G. Kofler: Three observations on the Danish Beneficial Ownership Cases http://kluwertaxblog.com/2019/03/13/three-
observations-on-the-danish-beneficial-ownership-cases/ 
19 The taxpayers being the Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) setting up these holding structures. 
20 Op. cit. notes 5 and 15.  
21 ”Conduit companies” is used as a description for an interposed company that enables benefits from an EU directive or a DTT. It does not 
make reference to abusive behaviour or conduct.  
22 See A. Lejour, J. Möhlmann and M. van ’t Riet: Conduit country the Netherlands in the spotlight, CPB Policy brief 2019/01. 
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3.2  The history of the cases  
The issues relating to the Danish beneficial ownership cases go all the way back to the late 
1990s/early 2000s when Denmark was an attractive jurisdiction for establishing holding companies. 
The reason was that back then Denmark did not levy any withholding tax on dividends paid to parent 
companies, regardless of residence. This policy was criticised by the EU for being unfair tax 
competition23, and in 2001 a condition that the withholding tax had to be lowered according to the 
PSD or a Double Tax Treaty (hereafter “DTT”) was added to the domestic rules as a requirement for 
the exemption to withhold the taxes. So, if the withholding tax on dividends was to be lowered for 
the foreign companies with limited tax liability to Denmark according to a DTT or the PSD, no WHT 
applied at all according to the national Danish rules. By the late 2000s, national political attention 
turned towards a number of large Danish companies that had been acquired by private equity funds 
under highly leveraged structures, resulting in a potential decrease in corporate income tax from 
these companies, at least from a theoretical point of view. Consequently, the Danish tax authorities 
launched a project to investigate seven specific acquisitions in order to determine whether they 
were compliant, inter alia, in terms of withholding taxes on dividends. 
 
The core of the cases was that Denmark had not implemented any measures by statutory law to 
combat abuse in relation to benefits from the PSD. The question was whether there was a basis for 
the Danish Ministry of Taxation to maintain that a taxation at source should have been levied 
because the recipients of the dividends or interest were in fact not the “beneficial owners”, which 
was a requirement according to the DTTs and the IRD (but not the PSD), thus allowing Danish tax 
authorities to deny the benefit to pay dividends without withholding tax at source.   
 
The two cases on withholding tax on dividends distributed by Danish companies to foreign 
companies were reviewed collectively by the CJEU under the file numbers C-116/1624 and C-
117/1625 and the final decision was published as C-116/16. For the purpose of the forthcoming 
analysis, a brief description of the cases and the facts will be provided below.  
 
3.3  The case C-116/16 – T Danmark  
T Danmark is a Danish listed service-providing company, in which more than 50% of the shares were 
held by N Luxembourg II. The remaining shares were owned by thousands of shareholders. N 
Luxembourg II was a company in Luxemburg incorporated by N Luxembourg in 2009. N Luxembourg 
held the majority of the capital; the remaining capital (less than 1%) was held by N Luxembourg III, 
i.e. indirectly by N Luxembourg. N Luxembourg was owned mainly by private equity funds, which are 
typically made up of a range of limited partnerships in non-EU member states with whom Denmark 
has no tax treaties, the Cayman Islands in this case. In 2010, N Luxembourg II acquired a large 
number of shares in the Danish company T Danmark. The vast majority of the dividends from T 
Danmark to N Luxembourg II were to be paid up the chain to the owners of N Luxembourg II (N 
Luxembourg and N Luxembourg III).  
 
                                                   
23 Working Group Report SN 4901/99 from 23 November 1999 from the ECOFIN Code of Conduct Group. 
24 DK: ECJ, Case C-116/16 Skatteministeriet v T Danmark. 
25 DK: ECJ, Case C-117/16, Skatteministeriet (The Danish Ministry of Taxation, Denmark) v. Y Denmark ApS. 
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Furthermore, the vast majority of the dividends from N Luxembourg II to N Luxembourg III were to 
be paid up the chain as dividends to N Luxembourg III’s owners (N Luxembourg) and subsequently 
paid up the chain to companies controlled by the equity funds or by N Luxembourg’s creditors. A 
small percentage of the dividends (3%-5%) was to be used by N Luxembourg, N Luxembourg II and N 
Luxembourg III to cover certain costs or to be allocated to a reserve for future costs. 
 
Figure 1: Dividend case I 
 
The Danish Ministry of Taxation held that the Luxemburg entities had been interposed in order to 
obtain a tax advantage and that the distributed dividends were not intended to be used by these 
entities, rendering them mere conduits and not the “beneficial owners” of the dividends. In order to 
be exempted from the obligation to withhold taxes at source on the dividends distributed, the tax 
needed to be lowered/waived according to the PSD or a DTT. The Ministry argued that the tax 
should not be waived according to the PSD because this would be contrary to the general anti-abuse 
principle of EU law, and that the lowering of the tax according to the DTT did not apply because the 
beneficial ownership requirement was not fulfilled. The reasoning for both arguments was that the 
Luxemburg entities had simply been interposed to obtain a tax advantage, and that no other valid 
business reason could be found for their existence.  
 
3.4  Case C-117/16 – Y Denmark ApS 
The case concerns a Danish subsidiary (Y Denmark ApS) distributing dividends to its Cyprus parent (Y 
Cyprus), which was granted a loan by its Bermuda shareholder (Y Bermuda) and used the dividends 
received to repay this loan. The loan was originally intended to be used in the acquisition of Y 
Denmark. Y Cyprus’s only activity was being a traditional holding company of Y Denmark. It had no 
office or staff. After its incorporation in 2000, Y Denmark acquired the shares in the company Y 
Netherlands by way of a group contribution from Bermuda Ltd. This was done to minimise tax as 




Until September 2005, Y Bermuda owned Y Denmark. The global ultimate owner of the group 
structure was Y USA, which was a listed US corporation. In September 2005, Y Bermuda incorporated 
Y Cyprus and this company was interposed between Y Denmark and the previous global ultimate 
parent company in Bermuda by way of an intra-group restructuring.  
 
Figure 2: Dividend case II 
 
 
The price for the acquisition was EUR 90 million and, following the acquisition, Y Denmark sold the 
shares in Y Netherlands to an affiliated Netherlands company. The shares were sold at a price of EUR 
14 million and Y Denmark recorded a receivable for the sale price from Y Netherlands.  
In September 2005, Y Denmark distributed dividends equivalent to EUR 75 million to Y Cyprus, and 
these dividends were used to pay off the receivable of Bermuda Ltd. In October 2006, Y Denmark 
declared another dividend distribution to Y Cyprus of EUR 12 million. Like the first dividends 
distributed, these later dividends were also passed on to Y Bermuda. 
 
Similarly to case 116/16, the Danish Ministry of Taxation held that the Cyprus entity had been 
interposed in order to obtain a tax advantage and that the distributed dividends were not intended 
to be used by this entity, rendering it a mere conduit and not the “beneficial owner” of the 
dividends. Consequently, the Ministry argued that the dividends should be regarded as if they had 
been paid directly to Y Bermuda and that neither the PSD nor the Denmark-Cyprus DTT would apply 
to lower the withholding tax rate. The fact that the dividend was redistributed all the way to Y USA 
and that the Danish-US DTT could potentially apply did not influence the end-result according to the 
Ministry as the Ministry considered that the Cyprus entity had been interposed in order to obtain a 
12 
 
tax advantage and could find no other valid business reasons for its existence; i.e. the Ministry 
considered the entire structure abusive and concluded that tax at source should have been withheld.  
 
3.5  Alignment between the EU and the OECD 
As described above in sections 3.3. and 3.4, the outcome of the Danish BO cases has provided the EU 
member states and their tax administrations with a strong remedy to combat tax avoidance in the 
form of an abuse test to apply in order to disregard certain beneficial structures.  
 
To draw the contours of this abuse test, common elements can be retrieved from the cases which 
also represent common denominators in the plans to combat tax avoidance from both the EU and 
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Consequently, the 
intermediate conclusion here is that the rulings stand as an example of the alignment between the 
EU and the OECD in combatting tax avoidance26. This alignment is significant because it is the most 
comprehensive cooperation between the EU and the OECD in the combat against tax avoidance so 
far. This cooperation is backed by the rules in ATAD and BEPS providing a minimum of streamlining 
between the member states’ combat against abuse, which are transposed directly into their national 
legislation. This makes way for a new international order to influence their combat against tax 
avoidance, and at the same time it creates uncertainty about the interpretation of the rules. While 
the rulings of the CJEU are not directly binding for the OECD network, the rulings in the Danish cases 
still provide insight into how abusive situations are to be determined in the tax world post ATAD and 
BEPS. The characteristics of the abuse test will be dealt with in section 4.  
 
  
                                                   
26 See also, S. Baerentzen: Danish cases on the use of holding companies for cross-border dividends and interest – A new test to disentangle abuse from real 
economic activity? (forthcoming - under peer review) 
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4 Weighing the tax benefits against other business benefits  
 
The two examples from the dividend cases described in section 3 present a picture of a common way 
of structuring multinational groups to gain tax advantages. This kind of structures have been used 
for many years and are still used, e.g. for acquisitions. The question remains whether they are still 
attractive following the outcome of the Danish beneficial ownership cases.  
 
As mentioned in the introduction, one of the main outcomes of the cases was that a general anti-
avoidance principle exists in EU direct tax law and that member states are not just allowed, but even 
obliged, to deny any benefit arising from abusive behaviour27. So when is enough “enough”? When 
is a structure sufficiently artificial to constitute an abusive situation and oblige the member state to 
disallow any advantages that e.g. the PSD may provide?  
 
The CJEU does not provide a detailed answer to this; however, in assessing a structure as potentially 
being abusive, it is first of all up to the tax administration (i.e. the member state) to demonstrate the 
presence of 1) the subjective element of the abuse test and 2) the objective element of the test, see 
below.  
 
EU member states are obliged to deny any benefit arising from the abusive behaviour. In the case of 
distribution of dividends, however, it is not only the PSD that provides for a potential reduction of 
the WHT, as a bilateral DTT between two member states can also provide a reduction. For the 
purpose of estimating the potential impact of the denial of directive benefits as a consequence of 
the Danish BO cases, it is necessary to consider reducing the WHT by an intra-EU DTT. It is assumed 
that such a possibility would undermine the effectiveness of the general anti-avoidance principle 
and hinder its coherent application. This is further substantiated by the principle of sincere 
cooperation in Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union, which determines that member states 
shall refrain from any measure which would jeopardise the attainment of the European Union’s 
objectives. If member states could circumvent the obligation to deny treaty benefits in abusive 
situations by way of a DTT, this would hinder the European Union’s objectives and would be 
incompatible with the principle of sincere cooperation.28 For the purpose of this, it is assumed that 
the benefits according to a DTT between two EU member states are to be denied in case of abuse, 
similarly to the obligation to deny the benefits according to the PSD, as an alternative interpretation 
would undermine the obligation to deny benefits in abusive situations according to the general EU 
anti-avoidance principle and the principle of sincere cooperation29. Finally, considering that the 
outcome of the cases gives a clear indication of the alignment between the EU and the OECD in 
combatting tax avoidance, it would appear to be counterproductive if there was indeed still an 
opportunity for taxpayers to achieve benefits in abusive situations by relying on a DTT between two 
member states.  
 
                                                   
27 For a thorough analysis of the legal aspects of the outcome of the cases, see S. Baerentzen, op. cit. note 14  
28 This questions has also been raised by MP Bart Snels in a number of questions for Menno Snel, the Dutch State Secretary of Finance: 
https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/kamervragen/detail?id=2019Z09124&did=2019D25250. The reply given to question 11 
regarding this issue is contrary to our presumption here.  
29 See also I. De Groot: Aan doorstroomvennootschap betaald dividend: Misbruik van recht, NLFiscaal 0597 (2019), p. 3-4,  L.C. van Hulten, & J.J.A.M. 
Korving: Svig og Misbrug: The Danish Anti-Abuse Cases, Intertax Vol 47, 2019, p. 799-798. For a similar argumentation regarding the PSD, see 
Weber, Dennis: The New Common Minimum Anti-Abuse Rule in the EU Parent-Subsidiary Directive: Background, Impact, Application, Purpose and Effects, 
Intertax, Issue 44/2, 2016, p. 104 ff.   
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4.1  Disentangling abusive behaviour from valid business decisions 
The abuse assessment described above is the linchpin in both Danish BO cases on dividends. It is also 
found in the latest addition to the measures to combat tax avoidance in the EU, i.e. the ATAD, which 
was introduced on 1 January 2019. In several aspects, ATAD carries out some of the action points of 
the OECD Base Erosion and Profit Shifting project (hereafter “BEPS”), and one of the examples of this 
can be found in the minimum requirement that member states have to implement a general anti-
avoidance rule (hereafter “GAAR”) which provides a clear legal basis for member states to disallow 
advantages from EU law or from Double Tax Treaties (hereafter “DDT”s).  
 
The wordings of the two general anti-avoidance measures are different, but overall the assessment 
is the same in the sense that they provide for an abuse test to be done based on a subjective and an 
objective element. This test allows the tax administrations to disregard e.g. conduit companies and, 
consequently, the benefits that their interposition entails.  
 
The GAAR in ATAD (Article 6) reads as follows:  
1.For the purposes of calculating the corporate tax liability, a Member State shall ignore an 
arrangement or a series of arrangements which, having been put into place for the main purpose or 
one of the main purposes of obtaining a tax advantage that defeats the object or purpose of the 
applicable tax law, are not genuine having regard to all relevant facts and circumstances. An 
arrangement may comprise more than one step or part.  
2.For the purposes of paragraph 1, an arrangement or a series thereof shall be regarded as non-
genuine to the extent that they are not put into place for valid commercial reasons which reflect 
economic reality.  
3.Where arrangements or a series thereof are ignored in accordance with paragraph 1, the tax 
liability shall be calculated in accordance with national law. “ (our underlining) 
 
In the OECD’s BEPS project, this rule is a so-called “principal purpose test”, which was implemented 
by the Multilateral Convention (hereafter the “MLI”) and the 2017 commentary to the OECD Model 
Convention (hereafter the “2017 MC”). Similarly to the ATAD GAAR, it provides member states with 
a legal basis to disregard certain structures put in place to obtain a tax advantage contrary to the 
object and purpose of the DTT. It reads as follows:  
“Article 7  Prevention of Treaty Abuse  
1. Notwithstanding any provisions of a Covered Tax Agreement, a benefit under the Covered Tax 
Agreement shall not be granted in respect of an item of income or capital if it is reasonable to 
conclude, having regard to all relevant facts and circumstances, that obtaining that benefit was one 
of the principal purposes of any arrangement or transaction that resulted directly or indirectly in that 
benefit, unless it is established that granting that benefit in these circumstances would be in 
accordance with the object and purpose of the relevant provisions of the Covered Tax Agreement. “ 
(our underlining) 
 
The objective element of the abuse test 
The so-called “objective” element of the abuse test is simply a test to establish whether granting the 
desired benefit would be contrary to the object and purpose of the DTT or e.g. the PSD. What 
exactly constitutes the object and purpose of a relevant DTT or EU directive has been the subject of 
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numerous academic works30, but post ATAD and BEPS, the intended object and purpose include a 
provision to combat tax avoidance. In other words, the object and purpose are no longer merely to 
enable the distribution of dividends between EU member states /DTT signing states, it is also to 
ensure the limitations to these distributions.  
 
The subjective element of the abuse test 
For the purpose of this article, the “subjective” element is solely defined as the balancing act in the 
taxpayer’s decision to move forward with a certain structure or transaction between, on the one 
hand, obtaining a tax benefit and, on the other hand, other business reasons. There may be several 
business reasons for interposing a holding company, e.g. due to corporate law requirement, as a 
means of creating the adequate control structure within the group or as a requirements for a 
financing structure, just to list a few. While it is likely that there are non-tax business reasons for 
interposing a holding company in most structures, if the main/principal purpose or one of them is to 
obtain a tax benefit, then the subjective element can still be fulfilled if the structure is not in 
accordance with the overall business reality of the group. Initially, it is for the tax administration to 
demonstrate that the subjective and objective elements exist (Para 116 in case C-116/16). 
 
If both elements exist, the onus of the burden of proof shifts from the tax administration to the 
taxpayer who has to demonstrate other valid business reasons for the transaction/structure and 
prove that these other reasons outweigh the tax reasons. The subjective test is merely considered as 
weighing the tax and non-tax elements in a transaction and disallowing the result if the tax elements 
are sufficiently large31.   
 
4.2  The indications of abusive situations 
After the CJEU handed down its preliminary rulings, the cases have now been referred back to the 
Danish High Courts which are left with the somewhat ungrateful task of assessing each case with its 
unique fact pattern in light of the CJEU rulings. The assessment made by the Courts is whether the 
specific situations constitute abuse and, consequently, whether no benefit should have been 
obtained and tax at source should have been withheld. Presumably, the cases will continue to the 
Danish Supreme Court no matter if the outcome is in favour of the taxpayer (MNE) or the tax 
administration/Denmark simply due to the very large potential taxable amounts in the six cases. This 
means that it is likely to take several years yet until the cases are finally decided at a national level.  
 
The CJEU has not rendered the national courts completely empty-handed in the abuse assessment 
as it has in fact provided six specific indications that point in the direction of an abusive situation, if 
they are present. This attention to both the details and the facts of the cases is quite remarkable for 
CJEU rulings as it is for the national courts to decide on the specific facts and final outcome of the 
cases. What is perhaps even more remarkable is the fact that large parts of the argumentation by 
the CJEU in relation to abusive situations appears to be lifted nearly verbatim from the 
argumentation of the Danish Ministry of Taxation in the cases before the national courts32. By 
                                                   
30 See e.g. S. van Weeghel: A Deconstruction of the Principal Purpose Test, World Tax Journal, 2019, 11(1) and D. Robert:  Treaty Abuse in the Post-
BEPS World: Analysis of the Policy Shift and Impact of the Principal Purpose Test for MNE Groups, Bulletin for International Taxation, January 2019, 
IBFD. 
31 See also S. Baerentzen, op. cit. note 14 for a thorough discussion of this topic.  
32 See Baerentzen, op cit note 14.  
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relying heavily on the argumentation of the tax administration in these cases, the CJEU has 
essentially given the seal of approval to large parts of the specific argumentation from the Danish 
Ministry of Taxation over the years. This peculiar circumstance makes the final outcome of the ruling 
even more important. 
 
The indications that a structure is sufficiently artificial to constitute abuse are as follows:  
1) If the group structure has been put in place to obtain a tax advantage (Para 100 in Case C-116/16);  
2) If all of/almost all of the dividends are redistributed up the structure shortly after being received 
(Para 101 in Case C-116/16);  
3) If the interposed holding company has an insignificant income due to the redistribution of the 
dividends (Para 103 in case C-116/16);  
4) If the sole activity of the holding company is to redistribute the dividends based on the lack of 
management, balance sheets, expenses, employees and office facilities (Para 104 in case C-116/16);  
5) If the contractual obligations (both legal and actual) render the holding company unable to enjoy 
and use the dividend (Para 105 in case C-116/16); 
6) If there is a close connection between the establishment of complex financial transactions and 
structures and new tax legislation (Para 106 in case C-116/16).  
 
Given the nature of the questions concerned in the rulings and given the high level of uncertainty 
they have entailed, it seems beneficial for the national courts to at least have some guidelines as to 
the interpretation of “abusive situations” going forward. At the same time, the indications provide a 
limitation to many of the existing private equity structures of today. These limitations are not of a 
legal nature as such, and they are not a direct continuation of CJEU case law in the area of anti-
abuse. They do, however, bear some resemblance to certain OECD guidelines on the combat against 
tax avoidance, and mostly the indications seem to be derived from economic theory rather than 
legal theory33.  
 
The likeness between the ATAD GAAR and the BEPS PPT is clear in the sense that both rules are 
based on an abuse assessment that consists of a subjective and an objective element, as described 
above. This abuse test is used to disentangle abusive behaviour from valid economic activity eligible 
for advantages according to EU directives and DTTs. Unravelling these types of behaviour is no easy 
task, and the CJEU has demonstrated clear alignment with the OECD and BEPS by specifically stating 
the indications of abusive situations based on well-known factual patterns and basic economic 
theory rather than by referring to existing EU case law. In other words: instead of referring back to 
existing EU case law specific for the EU direct tax area, it has provided indications of abuse which can 
be applied globally as well. This strongly suggests alignment between the EU and the OECD in 
combatting tax avoidance, cf. section 3.5. If indeed so, the effects of the rulings will go beyond the 
borders of the EU to the OECD member states.  
 
4.3  Computing the tax benefit of holding structures 
The subjective test in determining abuse amounts to a weighing of the tax benefits against other 
valid business benefits of a holding structure. The description of the cases provides us with the 
information to compute the first element of the test, the tax benefits.  
                                                   




We consider a stylised version of dividend case I from section 3. We have the entity in Denmark that 
distributes dividend to a holding company in Luxemburg. No withholding taxes are payable because 
of the PSD. The holding company is owned by an equity fund residing in the Cayman Islands, which 
does not have a DTT with Luxemburg, or with Denmark for that matter. After deduction of costs, the 
holding company in Luxemburg distributes the dividend to the owner, incurring dividend 
withholding taxation at the standard rate for Luxemburg.   
 
Now as to the amounts. The initial distribution is EUR 800 million.34 The costs of the holding 
company are taken to be 5% of the initial distribution, equal to EUR 40 million.35 The EUR 760 million 
distributed to the Cayman Islands is taxed at a rate of 15%, and in principle that results in a tax 
revenue of EUR 114 million to Luxemburg.36 
 
Next, we compare this tax cost with what would be incurred on the direct route of distribution from 
Denmark to the owner on the Cayman Islands, i.e. without the interposed holding company in 
Luxemburg. In that case, the standard withholding tax rate of Denmark, 28% at the time, would 
apply; a tax burden of EUR 224 million. The difference to the tax burden on the indirect route would 
be EUR 110 million, but this ignores the costs of the holding company. Deducting these costs results 
in a tax gain of EUR 70 million. This tax benefit has to be weighed against other business benefits; in 
many cases, this will be a tall order. Weighing the tax benefits against other business benefits is not 
limited to weighing solely the amounts as other factors may be relevant, cf. also above under section 
4.2. However, for the purpose of this , we use the amounts as an example to illustrate the cases.  
 
The second dividend case involves no less than five jurisdictions. The heart of the matter is a 
dividend distribution from Denmark to Bermuda, which is not an EU member state. By interposing a 
holding company in Luxemburg, withholding taxes could be avoided. First of all because of the tax 
benefit of the PSD for the payment from Denmark to Luxemburg. Next, the income is not taxed in 
Luxemburg as it applies a dividend participation exemption. And the repayment of debt from 
Luxemburg to Bermuda is not taxed in either country. Two dividend distributions in 2005 and 2006 
amounted to EUR 90 million.37 At a dividend withholding tax rate of 28%, the tax benefit is some 
EUR 25 million.  
  
                                                   
34 DKK 6 billion. 
35 Although both the percentage and the number may seem very high, they are based on the facts provided by the taxpayer (MNE) in the 
proceedings before the National Danish Tax Board. 
36 This basic calculation does not account for any possible reductions, as these are not the topic of this article. 
37 DKK 566 million in 2005 and DKK 92 million in 2006. 
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5 Network analysis of treaty shopping38 
 
In this second part of the article, we aim to quantify the possible impact of the rulings. The 
instrument used for this purpose, a network analysis, and the overall methodology are described in 
this section. 
 
5.1  The network approach and treaty shopping gain 
Above, we discussed cases in which the interposition of one or more holding companies in third 
countries resulted in tax gains for the MNE concerned. The ownership structures make an indirect 
routing of taxable corporate income possible. The tax gains were defined as the difference between 
the tax burden incurred on the direct route between the country of origin and destination and the 
tax incurred on the indirect route using the interposed holding company. The characteristics of the 
third country selected for accommodating a tax gain were not discussed so far. Could there be 
another country whose conduit function would lead to a larger gain? Or could a longer chain of 
holdings in various countries lead to higher tax benefits? Van ‘t Riet and Lejour (2018) formalise the 
notion of realising the full potential gain of treaty shopping over a large set of jurisdictions. As 
discussed in section 2, treaty shopping is used in the neutral sense of indirect routing in this article; 
no implication of abuse is intended.  
 
The international corporate tax system is considered a transportation network. In the network 
analysis, ‘shortest’ paths are computed which minimise the tax payments of MNEs when they 
repatriate profits. The tax 'distances’ between countries are constructed from corporate tax rates, 
withholding taxes on dividends and double taxation relief methods. Also the reciprocally reduced 
withholding tax rates in bilateral tax treaties are included. MNEs can reduce the tax burden on 
repatriated dividends by choosing the ‘cheapest’ tax route in the network. This may be an indirect 
route involving a conduit country and treaty shopping. MNEs may take advantage of treaty 
provisions not found between the ultimate host and home country of their investment. The network 
approach models this tax-optimising behaviour of MNEs. 
 
Figure 3: Treaty shopping with one conduit country      
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In a network of 108 countries, and with data from the year 2013, van ‘t Riet and Lejour (2018)39  
conclude that treaty shopping leads to an average potential reduction of the tax burden on 
repatriated dividends of 6 percentage points. For two thirds of all country pairs in the network, an 
indirect tax route is cheaper than the direct route. Using a centrality indicator from the network 
analysis, the most important conduit countries are identified; the United Kingdom, Luxemburg and 
the Netherlands.  
 
These results are obtained with the set of tax parameters mentioned before, and with an objective 
method. Moreover, the centrality indicator has been used in regressions as an explanatory variable 
for explaining the magnitude of bilateral FDI stocks; it proved to be statistically significant in a host 
of specifications and data selections.40 This supports the empirical validity of the method. 
 
5.2  Baseline 2018 
The network approach can be used for policy analysis by implementing changes in the tax 
parameters. A consistent set of such tax changes, and the underlying policy, is referred to as a policy 
scenario. In a study by CPB/OECD (2019)41, the network approach is used in an impact analysis of the 
BEPS Action 6 minimum standards. Not surprisingly, it is found that the higher the number of tax 
agreements compliant with the minimum standards, such as a principal purpose test (PPT), the 
larger the impact on the potential for treaty shopping. 
 
The analysis of policy scenarios is most meaningful when based on the most recent information. The 
network analysis is updated with tax parameters for the year 2018. Most data are obtained from the 
International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD). Some of the collected data are national tax 
parameters, but the bulk of the data are the bilateral non-resident dividend withholding tax rates 
from the tax treaties. 
  
The set of parameters includes the 2018 US Tax Reform, which features a reduction of the headline 
rate of the federal CIT from 35% to 21% and a switch from a so-called worldwide system to a 
territorial system. The latter implies, by and large, that now repatriated dividends are exempted 
from taxation in the USA instead of the credit system being applied as double tax relief. The baseline 
2018 results are similar to the results when applying the 2013 tax parameters.  
 
The foremost important indicator in our analysis is the tax reduction on repatriated dividends that 
may be accomplished by treaty shopping. This tax gain is realised when all distributed dividends take 
the tax-minimising route to the jurisdiction of the parent company. We call this the potential 
reduction of the dividend repatriation tax rate, or the treaty shopping gain. With this, we assume 
that the interposed holdings in the conduit country meet nearly all criteria of the indicators 
mentioned by the CJEU (see section 3.2.). All received dividend flows are sent to other countries. The 
interposed holding itself does not make any significant profit or can use the received dividends for 
other purposes. It does also not create other business activities and exists primarily because of the 
tax advantages. 
                                                   
39 We ignore the Brexit: the United Kingdom was a member of the EU in 2018, and so it is in our baseline. 
40 See footnote 6.  






The worldwide average treaty shopping gain in the 2018 baseline is 5.6 percentage points. It reduces 
the tax burden on repatriated dividends from 9.4% to 3.8% by devising optimal ownership 
structures. This means that investment is redirected, and the return to the investment follows the 
diverted route in the opposite direction. The 9.4% tax burden holds when all repatriation is on the 
direct route between the countries of the subsidiary and the parent company. We find that for two 
thirds of all country pairs, an indirect route is ‘cheaper’ than the direct route. 
 
The remaining tax burden of 3.8% consists of the taxation in the host country of the investment 
(source), the taxation in the home country (residence) and the taxation in the conduit countries; 
2.1%, 1.5% and 0.2%. The limited amount of tax revenues generated in the conduit countries is 
consistent with the fact that the interposed holdings do not have substantial other profitable 
business activities. For each host country, the average repatriation tax on outgoing dividends can be 
computed, as can also be done for each home country on incoming dividends. This has been done 
for direct routes (without treaty shopping) as well as for optimal routes. The difference between 
them is the treaty shopping gain for the MNEs. Annex A lists these average rates by country as 
distributor and receiver of dividends for all 108 countries. 
 
Having determined the optimal routes,42 we calculate which countries are most often used as 
intermediate stations on these routes. A so-called network centrality measure is computed which 
amounts to the diverted dividend flow going through the country. This measure and the ranking of 
countries are provided in Annex A. The countries most likely to function as a conduit on tax-
minimising routes are the United Kingdom (GBR), the Netherlands (NLD) and Sweden (SWE).43 Also 
ranked high, are Denmark (DNK), 7th, and Luxembourg (LUX), 9th.44  
 
                                                   
42 Often there are multiple optimal routes for a given country pair, see Van ‘t Riet & Lejour (2018), up cit. note 6. 
43 Again, this is not directly derived from international statistics, but it results from our modelling exercise. 
44 Luxembourg is attractive for other tax reasons too. For example, liquidation of a company in Luxembourg is treated as a capital 
transaction and is not subject to a dividend withholding tax, or, it has a general rate of zero on royalties and interest. Such characteristics 
have not been taken into account. To avoid arbitrariness we stick to the bare tax parameters. But this may explain the absence of 
Luxembourg from the top 3 in this analysis. 
List of some concepts used when referring to the tax network 
  link  country-country link, the direct bilateral route between two countries,  
in one direction (the other direction is a distinct link) 
  covered link link covered by a specific scenario, i.e. subjected to the treatment of the scenario  
(e.g. tax penalty when used on an indirect route) 
  prohibitive a tax penalty on a covered link that is high enough to effectively block  
        penalty the use of the link on an indirect route  
  direct route direct route between two countries, i.e. consisting of a single link 
  indirect route indirect route between two countries, i.e. of at least two links, and at least one conduit 
  optimal route route between two countries with the lowest repatriation tax possible,  
the ‘cheapest’ route, may be a direct route or an indirect route,  




In general, EU member states rank high on the ranking of network centrality. An important cause is 
the Parent-Subsidiary Directive of the EU (2003) which, in the qualifying situations that we assume, 
stipulates intra-EU repatriation rates of zero. 
 
5.3  Scenario analysis: definition and implementation 
To examine the possible impact of the CJEU rulings in the BO cases, we perform a so-called scenario 
analysis. We introduce below five policy scenarios, each involving a different set of tax parameters, 
and for each of these sets, the network computations are executed, thus answering the question as 
to what the impact on treaty shopping would be if the policy scenario is put in place. The results will 
be presented as changes with respect to the baseline 2018, which is the reference scenario.   
 
Table 1: Overview of policy scenarios and their characteristics  
 Policy scenario Implementing countries Covered links, no. Tax rate on covered links 
1. Denmark unilateral Denmark   107 Standard rate 
2. EU-wide EU and EFTA 3210 Standard rate 
3. Inclusive Framework  BEPS IF  3492 Standard rate 
4. EU-wide (p.p.) EU and EFTA 3210 Prohibitive penalty 
5. OECD-IF (Strong) BEPS IF & all OECD  6888 Prohibitive penalty 
 
First, we take the Danish tax authorities as a point of departure. Initially they denied the exemption 
of the dividend withholding tax from the PSD in a conduit situation involving a third country outside 
the EU. We imagine, i.e. as a thought experiment, that the Danish tax authorities perceive the rulings 
of the CJEU as full support and they will deny treaty benefits, including those from the PSD, on all 
dividend flows leaving Denmark that are part of an indirect route. This means on any route with (an 
entity in) a jurisdiction before Denmark and on any route with (an entity in) a jurisdiction after the 
immediate destination of the income payment. Direct dividend repatriation will be left untouched, 
meaning that here the usual bilateral withholding tax rates apply. This first scenario we dub 
‘Denmark unilateral (DNK-uni)’. 
 
Next, we consider the EU as this is, obviously, the jurisdiction of the CJEU. Here, we assume that 
each Member State will not grant tax privileges in conduit situations, not only when another 
Member State is the immediate destination of the dividends, but for all other jurisdictions. As 
before, direct repatriation routes are not affected. We refer to the second scenario as ‘EU-wide’. 
 
The EU-wide exercise will be contrasted with the reference situation, which will give a measure of 
impact. However, this measure may be difficult to interpret, to gauge, without another comparison. 
For that purpose, we introduce a third scenario from the CPB/OECD (2019) study45. Here, it is 
assumed that all tax agreements between members of the Inclusive Framework on BEPS are fully 
compliant with the Action 6 minimum standard (the MLI, as mentioned in section 3.2). This 
comparison makes sense because the PPT proposed under the MLI  is a similar economic test 
determining whether the tax benefits sufficiently outweigh the other business benefits as proposed 




by the CJEU. Hence, the ‘Inclusive Framework (IF)’ scenario.46 This third scenario covers a large 
number of country-country links subject to intervention.47 This is exactly why it may function as a 
comparison. In the set of 108 jurisdictions, the IF scenario covers 3492 country-country links. The 
EU-wide scenario covers 30 x 107 = 3210 links.48 The DNK-uni covers only 107 links, i.e. to all other 
jurisdictions in the network. 
 
The intervention in the network analysis for the covered links in a scenario is the denying of treaty 
benefits. This is implemented as follows: we replace the bilateral rate between two countries with 
the standard rate of the source country.49 For the Netherlands, this means a rate of 15% replacing 
the reduced treaty rates for qualifying situations. For some countries, such as the UK, the standard 
rate equals zero; denying treaty benefits then is of no consequence to the tax burden using such a 
link, and these links are therefore clearly candidates for treaty shopping purposes. 
 
Alternatively, we could ensure that the covered links can no longer be used at all for treaty shopping 
purposes. In this case, we intervene in the network analysis at link level with a prohibitive penalty. 
This is a tax that comes on top of the existing bilateral withholding tax rate. By adding a large 
penalty, we have made sure that it completely blocks the specified links for use on indirect routes 
(and we have verified this).  
 
This rather extreme implementation of denying treaty benefits gives rise to an additional scenario. 
Instead of the standard rate of the source country, we replace the bilateral rate between two 
countries with a tax penalty. We do so for all covered links, i.e. including those with source countries 
with a standard rate of zero. For those countries, the outcomes of both scenarios will differ most. 
Hence, the scenario with the prohibitive penalty as intervention will yield more impact on the treaty 
shopping potential. We do this for the EU-wide scenario. We refer to this fourth scenario as ‘EU-wide 
prohibitive penalty’. 
 
Finally, we introduce a fifth scenario in which we combine dealing with countries with a standard 
rate of zero including even more countries and links. We extend the set of links covered with all 
bilateral links of all OECD member states that were not already covered in the IF scenarios. The 
covered links are subjected to a prohibitive penalty. We refer to this scenario as ‘OECD-IF’, or 
‘Strong’ because of its expected impact. 
  
                                                   
46 Also covered are the Compliant Tax Agreements (CTAs) already in force and the CTAs coming into force and already notified under the 
Multi Lateral Instrument. Moreover, all US tax agreements containing LOB clauses that are supplemented by the United States’ domestic 
anti-conduit regulations are also considered as being agreements that can no longer be used for treaty shopping purposes. 
47 Beware: the CTAs in the CPB/OECD study are always two-way, while the DNK-uni and EU-wide scenarios are implemented one way, i.e. 
on outbound flows. 
48 EU-wide covers the EU27 and Iceland, Norway and Switzerland, which makes the 30 countries. Croatia is not included. 




6 Impact analysis: scenario results 
 
6.1 Scenario 1:  Denmark unilateral 
This scenario covers only the 107 outgoing dividend flows from Denmark, less than 1% (1/108) of the 
total 11556 links in our network analysis. Not surprisingly, the impact on the worldwide average 
treaty shopping gain is almost negligible; in the reference scenario, it is 5.60 percentage points, here 
it is 5.58 percentage points. The worldwide average tax rate after treaty shopping is only 3.79 
percentage points. 
 
For Denmark, the effects are non-negligible. To understand the outcomes, we must realise that 
Denmark ranks relatively high, in 7th place, on the conduit ranking in the baseline. This is due to its 
dividend participation exemption, its EU membership and its evolved network of bilateral treaties. It 
has, for instance, a zero dividend withholding tax rate, both ways, with the USA.  
 
Table 2: Top 5 countries with loss and gain in network centrality in Scenario 1: DNK unilateral 
DNK-uni Level Difference Ranking  DNK-uni Level Difference Ranking 
Centrality loss  Centrality gain 
DNK  -7.86 89  GBR 15.93 1.13 1 
SGP 6.43 -0.13 10  NLD 12.26 1.02 2 
MYS 4.99 -0.05 12  SWE 10.78 0.98 3 
ISR 2.42 -0.03 27  FIN 9.29 0.82 4 
USA 0.57 -0.03 45  EST 9.22 0.28 6 
 
With all of Denmark’s outgoing links made more expensive, when used for treaty shopping, Denmark 
drops in the ranking of network centrality to the 89th position, and it is effectively no longer used for 
treaty shopping. Compared to this drop, the changes for other conduit countries are negligible. 
Singapore and Malaysia lose a bit because they are no longer used as conduits on the diversion of 
dividend flows from Denmark. Some other countries gain in conduit status because Denmark is no 
longer used as a conduit. The right-hand side of table 2 shows that these countries are mainly the 
traditional conduits in our network ranking: the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Sweden. 
 
The average repatriation rate on dividend flows from Denmark is now 6.1%, an increase of 4.3 
percentage points.50 There is no change at all in the average rate on incoming dividends to Denmark; 
the optimal tax routes from the other countries are not affected by the tax penalty on flows leaving 
Denmark. Hence, for the other countries, their average outgoing rates are not changed. Some 
countries have a modest increase in their average incoming rate due to tax penalty levied on flows 
from Denmark. See Annex B.1 for results of this scenario at country level.  
 
Table 3 lists the links that lose and gain most in this scenario; it paints a clear picture. The links DNK-
USA and DNK-GBR are directly hit by the higher withholding tax rate on the outgoing flows from 
Denmark for treaty shopping. In the baseline, Denmark is, because of the bilateral zero withholding 
tax, a conduit country on tax-minimising routes from the USA. With the standard rate of 27% on 
                                                   
50 The bilateral repatriation rates are weighted with the GDP of the partner countries to construct the national average rates. 
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outgoing links from Denmark, these routes will no longer be chosen, and hence also not the starting 
link USA-DNK. These flows are now passing through GBR, NLD, SWE and FIN, which are the top 3 
conduit countries and number 6 in the baseline. Tax-minimising routes from China pass Denmark, in 
the baseline because the bilateral rate is 5%, the lowest level for outgoing flows from China. Also 
these flows disappear. Finally, Denmark is one of the few destination countries for which Israel has a 
zero withholding tax. The standard rate will also block Denmark as a conduit country for flows from 
Israel. Denmark will be replaced as a conduit by Estonia, for which Israel has a zero bilateral dividend 
rate. 
 
Table 3: Top 5 links with loss and gain in link use in Scenario 1: DNK unilateral 
DNK-
uni    difference   
DNK-
uni   difference  
Loss in link use  Gain in link use 
USA DNK -3.544  USA GBR 1.063 
DNK USA -1.398  USA NLD 0.832 
CHN DNK -0.544  USA SWE 0.722 
ISR DNK -0.518  USA FIN 0.719 
DNK GBR -0.510  ISR EST 0.209 
 
To sum up, the overall impact is that Denmark will no longer be attractive as a conduit country 
because MNEs can no longer use the reduced tax rates on outgoing flows from Denmark. For the 
position of Denmark as a conduit, the policy is effective but hardly has any impact at the global level.  
 
6.2 Scenario 2: EU-wide 
In the EU-wide scenario, we explore what happens when all outgoing links from the EU are subjected 
to a policy that denies the treaty benefits when the link is used on an indirect route, standard rates 
being applied instead of reduced bilateral rates. Within the EU, the PSD applies to direct dividend 
repatriation. This scenario covers 3210 links, almost 28% of all links. The treaty shopping gain is 
reduced by 1.1 percentage points to an average worldwide gain of 4.5%. The resulting worldwide 
average tax rate now is 5.8%. The 1.1 percentage-point reduction at world level may seem modest. 
Still, it is a fifth of the treaty shopping gain in the baseline. 
 
It must be realised that this is an average of all country-country links. The average increases in the 
dividend repatriation tax rates by country, incoming and outgoing, are given in Annex B2. For 
Greece, Ireland and Spain, for example, the increases of the average outgoing rates are 8.5, 7.5 and 
7.0 percentage points, respectively.  
 
Table 4: Top 5 countries with loss and gain in network centrality in Scenario 2: EU-wide 
EU-wide  Level  Difference  Ranking   EU-wide Level  Difference  Ranking  
Centrality loss  Centrality gain 
NLD 0.014 -11.222 53  GBR 25.106 10.309 1 
SWE 0.000 -9.807 105  SGP 13.530 6.969 2 
FIN 0.000 -8.469 74  MYS 11.594 6.550 3 
DNK 0.000 -7.857 71  ARE 9.992 5.461 4 




For 54% of the country pairs, an indirect route is optimal compared to the 66% in the reference. This 
indicates a substantial reduction of the indirect routes for treaty shopping, but also shows that  
ample possibilities for treaty shopping remain. Also the ranking of conduit countries completely 
changes as some EU member states are less likely to be used on indirect routes, see also Annex B2. 
The top 3 conduits are now the UK, Singapore and Malaysia. Other countries take over the role of 
conduits and replace some EU member states, albeit at a higher level of repatriation taxation. The 
UK (GBR) remains the top-ranking conduit country as it has a standard rate of zero. The other top 
conduits are also countries with a standard withholding tax rate on dividends of zero percent (SGP, 
ECU, MYS, CUW). Other European countries with a non-zero withholding tax on dividends are not 
conduit countries in this scenario compared to the baseline. Examples are the Netherlands, Sweden 
(CHE), Finland and Switzerland.  
 
Inspection of the changes to the bilateral links shows that similar mechanisms are at work as in the 
DNK-uni scenario. Dividend flows from the USA often use European countries for treaty shopping. 
The top 4 links that lose most from denying the treaty benefits are all links from the USA to a 
European conduit country. When these become more expensive, other routes for treaty shopping 
are used, quite often with some Asian countries or Australia as conduit countries, though these 
routes are not quite as beneficial as before. Due to the high GDP weight of the USA, the rerouting of 
these flows has a large impact on the global benefits of treaty shopping. 
 
Table 5: Top 5 links with loss and gain in link use in Scenario 2: EU-wide 
EU-wide  Difference   EU-wide  Difference  
Loss in link use  Gain in link use 
USA NLD -3.872  USA GBR 11.188 
USA DNK -3.523  AUS MYS 3.421 
USA FIN -3.334  USA AUS 2.859 
USA SWE -3.330  MLT IND 2.638 
SWE USA -1.686  GBR MYS 2.153 
 
To conclude, an EU-wide application of the Danish BO cases has serious consequences for some EU 
countries. These are no longer attractive as conduits because of the higher, standard, rates on the 
outgoing flows. This seriously limits the possibilities for treaty shopping. The treaty shopping gains 
are reduced by 1.1 percentage points. Other countries take over the role as conduits such as 
Singapore and Malaysia. Some EU member states are not affected since their standard rate is zero 
and denying treaty benefits is of no consequence. 
 
6.3 Scenario 3: Inclusive Framework (IF) 
To be able to assess whether the 1.1 percentage-point reduction of the treaty shopping gain is large 
or not we compare it with another scenario covering many countries and their treaties. This is the 
Inclusive Framework scenario, which covers almost 3500 links, including US links for tax agreements 
which contain LOB clauses supplemented by anti-conduit regulations. The treaty shopping gain is 4.2 
percentage points, which is 1.4 percentage points lower than in the baseline. The difference to the 
EU-wide scenario is only 0.3 percentage point. Given the comprehensive nature of the IF scenario 
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with its large number of covered links, we may conclude that the impact of the EU-wide scenario is 
large. 
 
Although the global impact of both scenarios is of similar magnitude, another set of countries is 
facing the larger impact as quite a different set of country links is affected. Annex B3 lists (in the 
column MCNT) the number of the links involved per country. The UK (GBR) is the country with the 
most affected links. Yet, in table 6, which presents the countries with the largest change in network 
centrality, we do not see it in the left panel. On the right, we even see that the UK gains and remains 
in first place in the conduit ranking. The reason that the UK wins as a conduit is that the link USA-
GBR is not affected for treaty shopping because there is no Compliant Tax Agreement between both 
countries, and hence this link is not covered. 
 
Table 6: Top 5 countries with loss and gain in network centrality in Scenario 3: IF (s.r.) 
IF (s.r.) Level Difference Ranking  IF (s.r.) Level  Difference Ranking 
Centrality loss  Centrality gain 
SWE 0.024 -9.783 48  ECU 21.926 19.421 2 
FIN 0.000 -8.469 90  GBR 24.046 9.249 1 
NLD 3.851 -7.385 14  CUW 10.392 8.376 3 
CHE 0.016 -6.957 50  JOR 6.689 5.794 6 
LUX 0.021 -6.941 49  LBN 4.645 4.626 10 
 
Observing the largest changes in link use makes clear what happens. Many EU countries lose their 
conduit function for flows from the USA, and these flows are diverted via the UK (GBR),as there is no 
CTA between the USA and the UK. Also Ecuador and Curacao become important conduit countries. 
These countries were in 26th and 35th place, respectively, in the conduit raking in the baseline. The IF 
scenario affects no links with Ecuador and only 6 with Curacao; hence, these countries are able to 
take over a key role in treaty shopping from traditional European conduits. 
 
Table 7: Top 5 links with loss and gain in link use in Scenario 3: IF (s.r.) 
IF (s.r.)  Difference 
 IF (s.r)  Difference 
Loss in link use  
 Gain in link use 
USA NLD -3.894  
 USA GBR 14.321 
USA DNK -3.542  
 CHN ECU 7.370 
USA SWE -3.361  
 CHN HKG 5.334 
USA FIN -3.345  
 CUW CHN 5.025 
CAN ISR -2.279  
 MLT IND 5.022 
 
There is another difference between the EU scenario and the OECD IF scenario, apart from just the 
set of links covered. In the former scenario, all outgoing links of the EU member states were 
affected, hence leaving them no ‘escape routes’, i.e. a link with a reduced treaty rate to be part of a 
treaty shopping route. Whereas in the OECD IF case practically all participating jurisdictions still have 
‘escape routes’. The USA and the UK are prominent examples of this. The reason for this is that the 
MLI for implementing the BEPS Action 6 minimum standard is essentially working bilaterally; 
jurisdictions indicate which bilateral tax agreements they want to be covered, which then has to be 
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reciprocated by the partner jurisdictions. As jurisdictions do not indicate all their treaties, some of 
the links remain open for treaty shopping purposes. 
 
To sum up, the overall impact of the IF scenario is comparable to the EU-wide scenario, there is a 1.4  
percentage-point reduction in the gain from treaty shopping. More or less the same number of 
country-country links is affected. An important difference, however, is that, in the IF scenario, the 
participating countries have ‘escape routes’. These are bilateral treaties with reduced rates which 
are not compliant with the minimum standard and can be used for treaty shopping. The USA-GBR 
link is an example. This explains why, notwithstanding the participation of the world’s largest 
economy, the impact is not much larger than in the EU scenario. 
 
6.4 Scenario 4: EU-wide - prohibitive penalty 
In this second EU-wide scenario, we explore what happens when all outgoing links from the EU are 
subjected to a prohibitive tax penalty when used on an indirect route. This is instead of replacing the 
bilateral reduced rates with standard rates. As before, within the EU, the PSD applies to direct 
dividend repatriation. The treaty shopping gain is reduced by 1.5 percentage points to an average 
worldwide gain of 4.1%. This reduction is 0.4 percentage point more than in the earlier EU-wide 
scenario. The reduction is even larger than in the IF scenario even though that scenario covers more 
links. This is all caused by the fact that now also the EU countries with a standard rate of zero 
percent are affected.51 
 
The ranking of conduit countries completely changes as none of the EU member states will now be 
used on indirect routes compared to the baseline, see also Annex B4. The top 3 conduits are 
Malaysia, Australia and Singapore, see table 8. The UK (GBR) disappears from the conduit ranking in 
comparison with scenario EU-wide. Other countries take over the role of conduits and replace all EU 
member states, albeit at a higher level of repatriation taxation. 
 
Table 8: Top 5 countries with loss and gain in network centrality in Scenario 2: EU-wide (p.p) 
EU-wide 
pp Level Difference Ranking  EU-wide pp Level Difference Ranking 
Centrality loss  Centrality gain 
GBR 0 -14.80 107  AUS 18.93 16.89 2 
NLD 0 -11.24 90  MYS 20.66 15.61 1 
SWE 0 -9.81 104  SGP 9.98 3.42 3 
LVA 0 -9.20 82  ARE 7.33 2.80 4 
EST 0 -8.94 69  ECU 4.85 2.34 5 
 
Dividend flows from the US often use European countries for treaty shopping. The top 5 links that 
lose most from blocking the possibilities for treaty shopping are all such links. This is similar to 
before. However, the most striking difference between table 9 and table 5 is the role of the UK 
(GBR). In the right panel of table 5, we see links of the UK gain in use, whereas in the left panel of 
table 9, we see the USA-GBR link losing most in use. 
 
                                                   




Table 9: Top 5 links with loss and gain in link use in Scenario 2: EU-wide (p.p) 
EU-wide pp  Difference  EU-wide pp  Difference 
Loss in link use  Gain in link use 
USA GBR -4.300  AUS MYS 16.126 
USA NLD -3.635  USA AUS 12.407 
USA DNK -3.445  MYS CHN 5.780 
USA FIN -3.273  JPN AUS 3.407 
USA SWE -3.206  SGP USA 1.922 
 
To conclude, an EU-wide stringent application of the Danish BO cases that also deals with the 
standard rate of zero percent of the withholding tax in some countries will have serious 
consequences for all EU countries. All of them are no longer attractive as conduits because of the 
penalty on outgoing flows. This seriously limits the possibilities for treaty shopping, with the gains 
reduced by 1.5 percentage points at the global level. For the EU countries, the effects are even 
larger.  
 
6.5 Scenario 5: OECD-IF (Strong) 
So far, we have encountered three constraints in combatting treaty shopping successfully. These are 
i) a low number of participating countries, ii) participating countries with ‘escape routes’ and iii) 
countries with a standard rate of zero. In our final policy scenario, we address all three of them. The 
IF scenario, number 3, is taken as a point of departure. First of all, we add to the set of participating 
countries the OECD member states not yet included. Secondly, for all OECD countries all outgoing 
links are covered; none of the OECD countries will have an ‘escape route’. Thirdly, we apply the 
prohibitive penalty, hence dealing with the standard rates of zero.52 In particular, additions two and 
three make the difference to the IF scenario.  
 
In this scenario, treaty shopping is all but eliminated, the worldwide average treaty shopping gain is 
reduced to a mere 0.3 percentage point. The average repatriation tax is now 9.0%. For only a fifth of 
all country pairs, an indirect route has a lower tax burden than the direct route. The top three of 
conduits are ECU, CUW and ARE. All remaining conduits are non-OECD countries. The values of the 
centrality indicator are also much lower than in previous scenarios, suggesting that the indirect 
routes are more spread over a number of countries instead of being concentrated via a few conduit 
countries. Besides, the number of indirect routes is much smaller.  
 
Table 10: Top 5 countries with loss and gain in network centrality: OECD-IF (Strong) 
OECD-IF Level Difference Ranking  OECD-IF Level Difference Ranking 
Centrality loss  Centrality gain 
GBR 0 -14.798 106  VEN 0.670 0.503 6 
NLD 0 -11.236 88  ECU 3.002 0.497 1 
SWE 0 -9.807 102  CUW 2.224 0.208 2 
EST 0 -8.938 68  BLR 0.426 0.170 7 
LVA 0.307 -8.889 19  LBN 0.110 0.090 25 
                                                   
52 This scenario resembles the final scenario in the CPB/OECD (2019) study where, for treaties involving an OECD member state, the links, 




The most important country links were those between the USA and European conduit countries, see 
table 11. These are no longer used in this scenario. It is interesting to observe that the links that gain 
in use are typically those links that were earlier avoided for direct dividend repatriation such as 
between the USA and China and the USA and Japan. These are also the largest economies. 
 
Table 11: Top 5 links with loss and gain in link use in Scenario 4: EU standard rates 
OECD-IF  Difference OECD-IF  Difference 
Loss in link use  Gain in link use 
USA GBR -4.300  CHN USA 5.138 
USA NLD -3.635  USA CHN 4.528 
USA DNK -3.445  JPN USA 2.118 
USA FIN -3.273  USA JPN 1.623 
USA SWE -3.206  USA DEU 1.252 
 
 
The upshot of policy scenario 5 is that with a large set of participating countries without ‘escape 
routes’ and when also the countries with a withholding tax of zero percent apply a tax penalty on 
indirect routes, treaty shopping disappears almost completely. 
 
6.6 Summary of scenario results 
Taking stock of the different policy scenarios, we first of all note that, with more links involved, the 
impact on the worldwide average resulting tax rate and the potential treaty shopping gain increases. 
With only 107 links in the scenario Denmark unilateral, no impact is visible, whereas in the scenarios 
with more than 3000 affected links, treaty shopping is substantially limited. The resulting tax rate is 
also higher, 1.1 to 1.4 percentage points higher than in the baseline, see table 12. Recall that these 
figures are worldwide averages, the differences between countries are huge. 
 
Table 12: Summary of results  
Baseline Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 




instrument  Standard withholding tax rate Prohibitive tax rate 
Links covered (number) 0 107 3210 3492 3210 6854 
Repatriation tax, direct routes (%) 9.37 9.37 9.37 9.37 9.37 9.37 
Repatriation tax, optimal routes (%) 3.77 3.79 4.85 5.15 5.28 9.03 
Treaty shopping gain (%) 5.60 5.58 4.52 4.22 4.09 0.34 
Reduction of treaty shopping gain (%)  0.02 1.08 1.38 1.51 5.26 
% pairs indirect route optimal 65.7 65.1 53.9 52.8 45.6 20.1 
Top 3 conduit countries: 1 GBR GBR GBR GBR MYS ECU 
                                              2 NLD NLD SGP ECU AUS CUW 
                                              3 SWE SWE MYS CUW SGP ARE 
 
Nevertheless, there is an impact on the dividend flows from Denmark in scenario 1. This affects the 
position of Denmark as a conduit country because it is no longer attractive as a conduit. We 
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particularly see the route from the USA to Denmark being used less. These flows are often 
redirected to other conduit countries.    
 
In the EU-wide scenario, more than 3000 links are blocked for treaty shopping by a prohibitive tax 
penalty. This seriously limits the possibility of treaty shopping. Of course, there are still opportunities 
for using indirect routes, but these are on average more expensive. EU countries are no longer 
conduits and Australia and some East Asian countries become relatively more attractive as conduits. 
This also indicates that American MNEs divert less dividend through Europe and that treaty shopping 
in Asia becomes more attractive. The average dividend repatriation tax rate is 4.9% now. This 
reduces the average treaty shopping gain by 1.1 percentage points. The IF scenario includes even 
more links and the overall effects are somewhat larger. Interestingly, there is no compliant tax 
agreement between the USA and the UK. As a result, the UK is still at the top of the conduit ranking. 
Generally speaking, missing CTAs mean that ‘escape routes’ exist for participating countries. The 
existence of ‘escape routes’ is a second important conclusion from our network analysis. The 
prohibition on the use of tax treaty benefits on an indirect route is only effective if all or nearly all 
indirect routes from the source country are included in the policy. 
 
The results of the EU-wide and IF scenario show the impact of using standard rates of withholding 
taxes instead of the reduced rates according to the treaties, following the outcomes of the Danish 
BO cases. This policy is more effective the higher the standard rates of withholding tax. However, the 
withholding tax rates may also be low or even zero percent. Then, there is hardly no cost of using an 
indirect route. For 30 of the 108 jurisdictions, the standard rate is zero percent  and denying treaty 
benefits is meaningless. Because of the large number of countries with a zero standard tax rate, 
treaty shopping is less restricted than with the absolute prohibition of the routes. This is an 
important third conclusion from the network analysis. It is illustrated in scenario 4, an EU-wide 
scenario with a high penalty on all routes instead of the standard rate of withholding tax. The 
resulting repatriation tax is 5.3 percentage points instead of 4.9 percentage points. The treaty 
shopping gains are reduced by an extra 0.4 percentage point in this scenario compared with EU-
wide. There are 8% less advantageous indirect routes. Because the outgoing routes of all EU 
countries are included, the UK is no longer a conduit country as it was with the zero percent tax rate. 
Australia becomes an important conduit country now.  
The resulting treaty shopping benefits are still sizable in spite of the reduction. The main reason for 
that is that many countries are not included in scenario EU-wide (p.p.). This is different in the IF 
scenario. If the prohibitive penalty is applied in the IF scenario and also applied on all routes from 
the OECD countries, treaty shopping becomes almost non-existent. For only 20% of the country 
pairs, an indirect route is advantageous and the average gain is only 0.3 percentage point globally. 
Some of the non-OECD countries are the new conduit countries, but the role of conduits is mitigated 
because indirect routes are less important now. Interestingly, it is not necessary that all countries 
implement the policy, but if the OECD countries implement the penalty with all their partner 
countries and vice versa, tax treaty shopping becomes a marginal tax avoidance strategy.53 
                                                   
53 Especially with the last scenario the market for conduit services may be small, as suggested by an index of diverted flows. This is 
explainend in Annex C. Also the strategic options for the remaining conduit countries are briefly mentioned. 
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On the other hand, we have demonstrated the risk of ‘escape routes’. Here there is a striking 
analogy  with the empirical study by Casi, Spengel and Stage (2018)54. Their title is “Cross-Border Tax 
Evasion After the Common Reporting Standard (CRS): Game Over?”  and their answer is “no”. The 
CRS is an OECD launched global standard for the Automatic Exchange of (tax) Information. The study 
reports a statistically significant decrease of deposits55 owned by EU and OECD residents in major 
offshore countries in the world upon the local implementation of the CRS as is the aim of the policy. 
However, it also documents that the cross-border deposits in the United States increase upon CRS 
implementation (by the other countries). They conclude that the US, which so far did not commit to 
the CRS, seems to emerge as a potentially attractive location for cross-border tax evasion. This is 
another illustration of the need to include as many countries as possible to combat tax avoidance 




                                                   
54 Casi, Elisa, Christoph Spengel and Barbara M.B. Stage, 2018, Cross-Border Tax Evasion After the Common Reporting Standard: Game 
Over?, University of Mannhein / ZEW Working Paper. 
55 Cross-border deposits from data of the Bank for International Settlements. 
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7 Conclusion  
 
We have used the recent rulings in the BO cases to provide an overview of the indications of abusive 
situations which will disallow the advantages according to EU directives and applicable DTTs. We 
conclude that the rulings represent a clear alignment of the policies to combat tax avoidance within 
the EU and the OECD. Furthermore, it is found that the rulings indeed provide guidelines to 
disentangle abusive behaviour from valid economic activity eligible for advantages according to EU 
directives and DTTs.  
 
It seems clear that the economic test conducted to draw this line affects the overall potential for 
treaty shopping as it is envisaged in both the principle purpose test as developed in OECD BEPS and 
the EU ATAD General Anti-Abuse Rule. Moreover, it is based on factual patterns found in the Danish 
beneficial ownership cases.  
 
To estimate the impact of these rulings on the overall potential for treaty shopping, we have used 
the network analysis developed by van ‘t Riet and Lejour (2018). This network analysis determines 
the cheapest tax routes for 108 countries, which are often indirect routes via other (conduit) 
countries. We have established that these routes change if treaty shopping from, and via, Denmark 
is no longer possible because of the CJEU rulings in the Danish BO cases. Moreover, we have 
analysed how dividend flows are affected if the outcome of the cases is applied to the entire EU and 
to all countries in the Inclusive Framework of the OECD BEPS project.  
 
The overall result for the different policy scenarios is that the worldwide average tax rate for 
repatriation of dividend will be higher and the potential treaty shopping gains will be lower. In the 
first scenario, only the dividend distributions from Denmark are affected, ultimately rendering it less 
attractive as a conduit country. However, from a global perspective, the potential for treaty 
shopping is hardly reduced.  
In the EU-wide scenario, the opportunities are seriously limited, and while there are still many 
opportunities for using tax-minimising indirect routes, these are on average more expensive. EU 
countries are no longer attractive as conduit countries. Including all countries of the OECD Inclusive 
Framework programme would even be more effective, but substantial possibilities for treaty 
shopping would still remain as other countries take over the role as conduit countries. These are 
non-EU and mainly non-OECD countries. Moreover the anti-abuse legislation in  bilateral tax treaties 
is only implemented if both countries agree to it (MLI principle), while we assume that the EU 
member states impose taxes on all outgoing dividend flows when part of an indirect route. This has 
different effects on the tax-minimising routes and position of conduit countries. 
The analysis also shows that the wider application of the outcome of the Danish BO cases has its 
limitations. Firstly, given that standard withholding tax rates on dividends are low or zero for some 
countries, indirect routes can still be attractive unless prohibitive taxes could be imposed. Secondly, 
even if all countries of the BEPS Inclusive Framework implement the case outcomes in their tax 
policy, possibilities for treaty shopping still remain as long as the participating countries allow for 
escape routes, i.e. treaties not covered. It is important to stress the inclusion of as many countries as 
possible with all their bilateral treaties to combat treaty shopping effectively. 
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List of abbreviations 
 
ATADI: Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive - Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016 – EU 
directive laying down rules against tax avoidance practices that directly affect the functioning of the 
internal market. 
BEPS: Base Erosion and Profit Shifting - OECD/G20 project to set up an international framework to 
combat tax avoidance by multinational enterprises ("MNEs") using base erosion and profit 
shifting tools.   
CJEU: Court of Justice of the European Union (as of 1 December 2009) or Court of Justice of the 
European Communities (before 1 December 2009)  
CPB: Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 
CTA: Compliant Tax Agreement 
DTT: Double Tax Treaty 
GAAR: General Anti-Avoidance Rule 
IBFD: International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation 
IRD: Interest and Royalties Directive - Council Directive 2003/49/EC of 3 June 2003 on a common 
system of taxation applicable to interest and royalty payments made between associated companies 
of different Member States 
LOB: Limitation Of Benefits – Provisions in Double Tax Treaties to eliminate treaty shopping 
MLI:  Multilateral Instrument – OECD Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related 
Measures to Prevent BEPS 
OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OECD MC: OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital 
OECD MC Commentary: Explanatory commentary to the OECD Model Tax Convention  
PSD: Parent-Subsidiary Directive – Council Directive 90/435/EEC of 23 July 1990 on the common 
system of taxation applicable in the case of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member 
States as amended by Council Directive 2003/123/EC of 22 December 2003 
PPT: Principal Purpose Test: Anti-abuse rule based on the principal purposes of transactions or 
arrangements as found in Article 7 of the OECD Multilateral Instrument or the 2017 commentary to 






CIT  Corporate Income Tax rate (%) 
WHT STD Standard rate of Withholding Tax on dividends (%) 
SHOPOUT The average repatriation tax rate for dividends  (%) 
coming from the (source) jurisdiction concerned, on optimal routes 
SHOPIN  The average repatriation tax rate for dividends (%) 
going to the (destination) jurisdiction concerned, on optimal routes 
TS GAIN OUT The average Treaty Shopping Gain for outgoing dividends (%),  
i.e. the difference between the rates on the optimal and the direct routes,  
for the jurisdiction concerned 
TS GAIN IN The average Treaty Shopping Gain for incoming dividends (%),  
i.e. the difference between the rates on the optimal and the direct routes,  
for the jurisdiction concerned 
 
 
  TAXES REPATRIATION TAX CENTRALITY 
COUNTRY Code CIT WHT std SHOPOUT SHOPIN TS Gain Out TS Gain In Value             Ranking 
ALBANIA ALB 15 15 1.74 1.90 11.75 13.95 0.06 69 
ALGERIA DZA 23 15 1.70 24.46 10.69 10.49 
 
84 
ANGOLA AGO 30 10 10.81 31.32 0.28 12.44 
 
85 
ARGENTINA ARG 35 35 11.50 13.40 20.19 6.27 
 
86 
ARUBA ABW 25 10 6.59 1.90 23.45 17.64 0.00 79 
AUSTRALIA AUS 30 30 1.71 1.93 7.35 5.23 2.04 34 
AUSTRIA AUT 25 25 1.75 1.91 5.10 3.67 1.99 37 
AZERBAIJAN AZE 20 10 6.66 1.90 4.34 14.42 0.03 73 
BAHAMAS BHS 0 0 1.74 1.90 21.90 17.75 0.46 53 
BAHRAIN BHR 46 0 1.48 1.90 20.84 15.86 0.90 43 
BARBADOS BRB 25 15 1.74 1.90 27.21 8.72 0.33 56 
BELARUS BLR 18 12 1.74 1.90 10.05 14.39 0.26 58 
BELGIUM BEL 33.99 30 1.63 1.91 3.42 3.21 2.85 22 
BERMUDA BMU 0 0 1.74 1.90 21.90 17.75 0.46 51 
BOTSWANA BWA 30 7.5 8.37 7.90 0.29 11.86 0.00 82 
BRAZIL BRA 34 15 11.15 12.42 4.32 7.37 
 
87 
BRUNEI DARUSSALAM BRN 18.5 0 1.74 1.90 2.76 16.07 2.63 23 
BULGARIA BGR 10 5 1.74 1.90 5.69 5.23 3.30 19 
CANADA CAN 26.3 25 1.75 1.94 6.85 5.88 0.04 70 
CAYMAN ISLANDS CYM 0 0 1.74 1.90 21.90 17.75 0.46 50 
CHILE CHL 25 35 3.25 2.07 18.87 13.27 0.14 61 
CHINA CHN 25 10 6.62 1.57 3.32 7.96 0.04 71 
COLOMBIA COL 34 5 1.36 12.33 4.65 8.91 0.00 77 
COSTA RICA CRI 30 15 16.24 31.32 17.42 11.77 
 
88 
CROATIA HRV 18 12 1.73 19.56 9.04 9.88 
 
89 
CURACAO CUW 22 0 1.74 1.90 1.47 17.75 2.02 35 
CYPRUS CYP 12.5 0 1.74 1.90 16.57 6.11 2.60 24 
CZECH REPUBLIC CZE 19 15 1.75 1.90 5.20 3.60 2.25 30 
DENMARK DNK 22 27 1.75 1.90 4.35 2.40 7.86 7 





ECUADOR ECU 22 0 1.74 1.90 1.36 15.11 2.50 26 
EGYPT EGY 22.5 10 1.75 1.91 5.10 12.39 0.35 55 
EQUATORIAL GUINEA GNQ 35 25 25.70 36.23 0.23 11.54 
 
91 
ESTONIA EST 20 0 1.74 1.90 1.82 5.34 8.94 5 
FINLAND FIN 20 20 1.75 1.90 3.70 2.15 8.47 6 
FRANCE FRA 33.33 30 1.73 1.96 2.94 2.53 2.95 20 
GABON GAB 30 20 16.05 1.89 4.43 16.94 
 
92 
GERMANY DEU 30.2 25 1.77 1.99 5.17 2.44 2.41 28 
GREECE GRC 29 15 1.75 1.90 8.48 11.73 1.93 38 
GUERNSEY GRN 0 0 1.74 1.90 21.90 17.74 0.47 47 
HONGKONG HKG 16.5 0 1.75 1.90 21.27 12.75 1.99 36 
HUNGARY HUN 9 0 1.74 1.90 4.79 4.66 6.70 10 
ICELAND ISL 20 18 1.74 1.90 6.49 5.42 1.92 39 
INDIA IND 30 0 1.20 8.32 0.31 4.94 0.08 65 
INDONESIA IDN 25 20 6.60 2.06 5.40 8.57 0.00 76 
IRELAND IRL 12.5 20 1.75 1.90 7.52 3.89 3.43 18 
ISLE OF MAN IMN 0 0 1.74 1.90 21.90 17.75 0.46 52 
ISRAEL ISR 24 25 1.75 1.90 10.83 8.01 2.45 27 
ITALY ITA 27.9 26 1.77 1.95 6.27 5.48 1.08 41 
JAMAICA JAM 25 33.33 6.62 2.07 12.76 18.25 
 
93 
JAPAN JPN 35.4 20 1.73 3.76 4.64 4.82 0.08 64 
JERSEY JRY 0 0 1.74 1.90 21.90 17.74 0.47 48 
JORDAN JOR 20 0 1.74 1.90 2.05 29.64 0.90 44 
KAZAKHSTAN KAZ 20 15 1.74 1.90 7.14 7.44 0.04 72 
KOREA REPUBLIC KOR 22 20 20.76 1.54 0.25 6.49 
 
94 
KUWAIT KWT 15 0 1.72 16.61 3.64 9.20 
 
95 
LATVIA LVA 15 0 1.74 1.90 3.40 3.69 9.20 4 
LEBANON LBN 15 10 1.74 1.90 28.18 26.59 0.02 75 
LIBYA LBY 20 0 1.74 6.80 2.20 28.89 
 
96 
LIECHTENSTEIN LIE 12.5 0 1.74 1.90 21.37 16.06 0.74 45 
LITHUANIA LTU 15 15 1.74 1.90 6.99 5.01 2.53 25 
LUXEMBOURG LUX 27.08 15 1.55 1.90 1.01 3.75 6.96 9 
MACAO MAC 12 0 1.74 13.67 21.40 14.92 
 
97 
MALAYSIA MYS 24 0 1.75 1.90 0.47 11.49 5.04 13 
MALTA MLT 35 0 1.48 1.90 16.06 4.84 4.28 15 
MAURITIUS MUS 15 0 1.74 1.90 21.26 14.21 1.03 42 
MEXICO MEX 30 10 1.27 31.35 5.48 1.52 
 
98 
MONGOLIA MNG 25 20 6.62 2.06 8.83 25.01 
 
99 
NAMIBIA NAM 32 10 1.64 11.08 8.98 29.26 
 
100 
NETHERLANDS NLD 25 15 1.74 1.92 2.20 1.31 11.24 2 
NEW ZEALAND NZL 28 30 1.74 5.37 11.54 5.26 0.11 62 
NIGERIA NGA 30 10 8.56 7.59 2.16 11.56 0.00 83 
NORWAY NOR 24 25 1.75 1.91 9.60 6.73 2.28 29 
OMAN OMN 15 10 11.57 1.89 0.76 13.06 0.07 67 
PAKISTAN PAK 30 12.5 6.39 31.32 5.50 6.80 
 
101 
PANAMA PAN 25 10 5.65 1.90 24.26 16.15 0.00 78 
36 
 
PERU PER 30 5 5.93 7.86 0.29 12.83 
 
102 
PHILIPPINES PHL 30 30 7.98 7.86 8.89 6.15 
 
103 
POLAND POL 19 19 1.75 1.91 5.89 4.55 1.51 40 
PORTUGAL PRT 27.5 25 1.67 1.90 6.15 4.68 2.25 31 
PUERTO RICO PRI 30 15 15.80 1.88 0.26 17.77 0.00 80 
QATAR QAT 10 0 1.74 1.90 5.68 13.68 2.91 21 
ROMANIA ROM 16 5 1.75 1.90 5.31 5.42 3.53 17 
RUSSIAN FEDERATION RUS 20 15 1.77 1.93 6.96 5.25 0.36 54 
SAUDI ARABIA SAU 20 5 1.60 21.53 5.42 10.23 
 
104 
SERBIA AND MONT. YUG 15 20 20.85 1.88 0.25 17.87 
 
105 
SEYCHELLES SYC 30 15 1.74 1.90 30.67 16.62 0.25 59 
SINGAPORE SGP 17 0 1.75 1.90 2.78 10.97 6.56 11 
SLOVAK REPUBLIC SVK 21 0 1.74 1.90 1.33 10.95 6.20 12 
SLOVENIA SVN 19 15 1.74 1.90 5.47 4.25 2.08 32 
SOUTH AFRICA ZAF 28 15 1.69 1.90 5.50 4.52 2.08 33 
SPAIN ESP 29 19 1.64 1.93 6.98 5.22 4.21 16 
SURINAME SUR 36 25 9.11 1.90 16.54 17.60 
 
106 
SWEDEN SWE 22 30 1.75 1.91 3.53 1.79 9.81 3 
SWITZERLAND CHE 21.1 35 1.76 1.91 4.80 2.18 6.97 8 
TAIWAN PROVINCE TWN 17 20 6.67 1.83 11.23 14.66 0.00 81 
THAILAND THA 20 10 11.00 1.85 0.47 9.12 0.06 68 
TRINIDAD AND TOB. TTO 25 10 1.73 2.06 8.43 14.21 0.07 66 
TUNISIA TUN 25 5 1.70 26.42 4.74 8.14 
 
107 
TURKEY TUR 20 15 6.67 1.86 6.62 9.23 0.02 74 
UKRAINE UKR 18 15 1.74 1.90 7.14 5.76 0.31 57 
UNTD ARAB EMIRATES ARE 0 0 1.75 1.91 7.90 11.16 4.53 14 
UNITED KINGDOM GBR 20 0 1.80 1.97 1.61 1.52 14.80 1 
UNITED STATES USA 21 30 2.49 2.54 8.25 3.95 0.60 46 
URUGUAY URY 25 7 1.72 1.90 6.27 16.25 0.09 63 
VENEZUELA VEN 34 34 1.63 11.34 11.64 3.38 0.17 60 
VIRGIN ISLANDS U.S. VIR 38.5 11 12.32 17.95 18.55 5.98 
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Annex B.1  Denmark unilateral 
 
MCNT  The number of incoming or outgoing links involved, for the jurisdiction concerned (max 214 
  per jurisdiction). This is twice the number of Compliant Tax Agreements (CTAs) in scenarios 3 
  and 5 
SHOPOUT The average repatriation tax rate for dividends  
coming from the (source) jurisdiction concerned, on optimal routes 
SHOPIN  The average repatriation tax rate for dividends  
going to the (destination) jurisdiction concerned, on optimal routes 
DIFOUT (IN) Difference (change) in the average repatriation tax rates, for outgoing (incoming) 
dividend flows. These values are always positive because all policy scenarios limit the 
treaty shopping possibilities 
CENTRALITY The network centrality indicator, indicating centrality in the tax network 
VALUE  The value of the centrality indicator. We use the Betweenness indicator 
RANK (REF) Ranking of jurisdictions on the network centrality indicator, i.e. network centrality,  
for the current scenario (and for the REFerence scenario) 
DIFVAL Difference between the value of the network centrality indicator in the policy scenario 
and that in the baseline scenario. A positive value means an increase in relative 
network centrality. 
 
CTR LINKS REPATRIATION TAX CENTRALIY 
 
MCNT SHOPOUT SHOPIN DIFOUT DIFIN VALUE RANK RANK 
REF 
DIFVAL 
ALB 1 1.74 2.01 0 0.11 0.06 68 69 0.00 
DZA 1 1.70 24.55 0 0.09 
 
83 84 0.00 
AGO 1 10.81 31.40 0 0.08 
 
84 85 0.00 
ARG 1 11.50 13.41 0 0.01 
 
85 86 0.00 
ABW 1 6.59 2.01 0 0.11 0.00 78 79 0.00 
AUS 1 1.71 1.99 0 0.06 2.32 28 34 0.28 
AUT 1 1.75 1.91 0 0.00 2.02 36 37 0.03 
AZE 1 6.66 1.92 0 0.02 0.03 72 73 0.00 
BHS 1 1.74 2.01 0 0.11 0.49 52 53 0.02 
BHR 1 1.48 2.01 0 0.11 0.95 43 43 0.04 
BRB 1 1.74 2.01 0 0.11 0.36 55 56 0.02 
BLR 1 1.74 1.96 0 0.06 0.28 57 58 0.02 
BEL 1 1.63 1.91 0 0.00 2.90 21 22 0.05 
BMU 1 1.74 2.01 0 0.11 0.49 50 51 0.02 
BWA 1 8.37 7.98 0 0.08 0.00 81 82 0.00 
BRA 1 11.15 12.47 0 0.05 
 
86 87 0.00 
BRN 1 1.74 2.01 0 0.11 2.76 22 23 0.13 
BGR 1 1.74 1.90 0 0.00 3.38 18 19 0.08 
CAN 1 1.75 1.96 0 0.02 0.04 69 70 0.00 
CYM 1 1.74 2.01 0 0.11 0.49 49 50 0.02 
CHL 1 3.25 2.09 0 0.02 0.15 60 61 0.01 
CHN 1 6.62 1.59 0 0.02 0.04 70 71 0.00 
COL 1 1.36 12.39 0 0.06 0.00 76 77 0.00 
CRI 1 16.24 31.40 0 0.08 
 
87 88 0.00 
HRV 1 1.73 19.57 0 0.02 
 
88 89 0.00 
CUW 1 1.74 2.01 0 0.11 2.12 32 35 0.11 
CYP 1 1.74 1.90 0 0.00 2.63 25 24 0.03 
38 
 
CZE 1 1.75 1.90 0 0.00 2.29 30 30 0.04 
DNK 107 6.09 1.90 4.346 0.00 
 
89 7 -7.86 
DOM 1 1.63 28.47 0 0.08 
 
90 90 0.00 
ECU 1 1.74 2.01 0 0.11 2.64 24 26 0.13 
EGY 1 1.75 1.97 0 0.06 0.38 53 55 0.03 
GNQ 1 25.70 36.30 0 0.07 
 
91 91 0.00 
EST 1 1.74 1.90 0 0.00 9.22 6 5 0.28 
FIN 1 1.75 1.90 0 0.00 9.29 4 6 0.82 
FRA 1 1.73 1.96 0 0.00 2.99 20 20 0.04 
GAB 1 16.05 2.01 0 0.11 
 
92 92 0.00 
DEU 1 1.77 1.99 0 0.00 2.45 26 28 0.04 
GRC 1 1.75 1.90 0 0.00 1.96 37 38 0.03 
GRN 1 1.74 2.01 0 0.11 0.49 46 47 0.02 
HKG 1 1.75 2.02 0 0.11 2.08 35 36 0.08 
HUN 1 1.74 1.90 0 0.00 6.72 9 10 0.03 
ISL 1 1.74 1.90 0 0.00 1.95 38 39 0.03 
IND 1 1.20 8.36 0 0.03 0.08 64 65 0.00 
IDN 1 6.60 2.10 0 0.04 0.00 75 76 0.00 
IRL 1 1.75 1.90 0 0.00 3.48 17 18 0.05 
IMN 1 1.74 2.01 0 0.11 0.49 51 52 0.02 
ISR 1 1.75 1.90 0 0.00 2.42 27 27 -0.03 
ITA 1 1.77 1.95 0 0.00 1.09 41 41 0.01 
JAM 1 6.62 2.11 0 0.04 
 
93 93 0.00 
JPN 1 1.73 3.80 0 0.04 0.08 63 64 0.00 
JRY 1 1.74 2.01 0 0.11 0.49 47 48 0.02 
JOR 1 1.74 2.07 0 0.17 0.96 42 44 0.06 
KAZ 1 1.74 2.01 0 0.11 0.04 71 72 0.00 
KOR 1 20.76 1.60 0 0.06 
 
94 94 0.00 
KWT 1 1.72 16.61 0 0.00 
 
95 95 0.00 
LVA 1 1.74 1.90 0 0.00 9.27 5 4 0.08 
LBN 1 1.74 2.06 0 0.16 0.02 74 75 0.00 
LBY 1 1.74 6.96 0 0.15 
 
96 96 0.00 
LIE 1 1.74 2.01 0 0.11 0.77 44 45 0.03 
LTU 1 1.74 1.90 0 0.00 2.66 23 25 0.13 
LUX 1 1.55 1.90 0 0.00 7.04 7 9 0.08 
MAC 1 1.74 13.77 0 0.10 
 
97 97 0.00 
MYS 1 1.75 1.90 0 0.00 4.99 12 13 -0.05 
MLT 1 1.48 1.90 0 0.00 4.43 14 15 0.15 
MUS 1 1.74 2.01 0 0.11 1.09 40 42 0.06 
MEX 1 1.27 31.35 0 0.00 
 
98 98 0.00 
MNG 1 6.62 2.25 0 0.19 
 
99 99 0.00 
NAM 1 1.64 11.24 0 0.17 
 
100 100 0.00 
NLD 1 1.74 1.92 0 0.00 12.26 2 2 1.02 
NZL 1 1.74 5.42 0 0.05 0.12 61 62 0.01 
NGA 1 8.56 7.67 0 0.08 0.00 82 83 0.00 
NOR 1 1.75 1.91 0 0.00 2.31 29 29 0.03 
39 
 
OMN 1 11.57 2.00 0 0.11 0.07 66 67 0.00 
PAK 1 6.39 31.36 0 0.04 
 
101 101 0.00 
PAN 1 5.65 2.01 0 0.11 0.00 77 78 0.00 
PER 1 5.93 7.95 0 0.08 
 
102 102 0.00 
PHL 1 7.98 7.88 0 0.01 
 
103 103 0.00 
POL 1 1.75 1.91 0 0.00 1.53 39 40 0.02 
PRT 1 1.67 1.90 0 0.00 2.26 31 31 0.01 
PRI 1 15.80 1.99 0 0.11 0.00 79 80 0.00 
QAT 1 1.74 2.01 0 0.11 3.04 19 21 0.13 
ROM 1 1.75 1.90 0 0.00 3.54 16 17 0.01 
RUS 1 1.77 1.97 0 0.04 0.38 54 54 0.02 
SAU 1 1.60 21.62 0 0.09 
 
104 104 0.00 
YUG 1 20.85 1.99 0 0.11 
 
105 105 0.00 
SYC 1 1.74 2.01 0 0.11 0.26 58 59 0.01 
SGP 1 1.75 1.90 0 0.00 6.43 10 11 -0.13 
SVK 1 1.74 1.90 0 0.00 6.21 11 12 0.01 
SVN 1 1.74 1.90 0 0.00 2.12 33 32 0.03 
ZAF 1 1.69 1.93 0 0.02 2.09 34 33 0.01 
ESP 1 1.64 1.93 0 0.00 4.32 15 16 0.12 
SUR 1 9.11 2.01 0 0.11 
 
106 106 0.00 
SWE 1 1.75 1.91 0 0.00 10.78 3 3 0.98 
CHE 1 1.76 1.91 0 0.00 7.01 8 8 0.04 
TWN 1 6.67 1.87 0 0.04 0.00 80 81 0.00 
THA 1 11.00 1.89 0 0.04 0.06 67 68 0.00 
TTO 1 1.73 2.10 0 0.04 0.08 65 66 0.00 
TUN 1 1.70 26.47 0 0.05 
 
107 107 0.00 
TUR 1 6.67 1.92 0 0.06 0.02 73 74 0.00 
UKR 1 1.74 1.92 0 0.02 0.33 56 57 0.02 
ARE 1 1.75 2.02 0 0.11 4.75 13 14 0.22 
GBR 1 1.80 1.97 0 0.00 15.93 1 1 1.13 
USA 1 2.49 2.54 0 0.00 0.57 45 46 -0.03 
URY 1 1.72 2.01 0 0.11 0.10 62 63 0.01 
VEN 1 1.63 11.35 0 0.01 0.17 59 60 0.00 
VIR 1 12.32 17.98 0 0.04 
 
108 108 0.00 









Annex B.2  EU wide standard rate 
CTR LINKS REPATRIATION TAX CENTRALIY 
 
MCNT SHOPOUT SHOPIN DIFOUT DIFIN VALUE RANK RANK 
REF 
DIFVAL 
ALB 30 6.37 3.14 4.63 1.24 0.1163 45 69 0.0589 
DZA 30 1.61 26.10 -0.09 1.64 
 
60 84 0.0000 
AGO 30 10.96 34.78 0.15 3.46 
 
61 85 0.0000 
ARG 30 11.41 13.89 -0.08 0.49 
 
62 86 0.0000 
ABW 30 11.36 6.73 4.77 4.83 
 
63 79 0.0000 
AUS 30 1.62 4.61 -0.09 2.68 6.4661 10 34 4.4258 
AUT 136 6.83 1.96 5.08 0.06 
 
64 37 -1.9918 
AZE 30 6.57 3.67 -0.08 1.77 0.1067 46 73 0.0752 
BHS 30 1.65 6.83 -0.09 4.94 0.9364 29 53 0.4732 
BHR 30 1.65 5.19 0.17 3.29 1.2924 20 43 0.3893 
BRB 30 1.65 5.35 -0.09 3.46 0.6645 36 56 0.3302 
BLR 30 1.65 3.69 -0.09 1.79 0.4629 39 58 0.2069 
BEL 136 5.03 3.22 3.40 1.31 
 
65 22 -2.8526 
BMU 30 1.65 6.83 -0.09 4.93 0.9373 27 51 0.4736 
BWA 30 8.52 5.89 0.16 -2.01 0.0032 56 82 0.0031 
BRA 30 11.12 13.80 -0.03 1.38 
 
66 87 0.0000 
BRN 30 1.65 6.82 -0.09 4.92 6.9437 9 23 4.3170 
BGR 136 3.82 1.95 2.07 0.06 
 
67 19 -3.3010 
CAN 30 1.65 3.87 -0.09 1.94 0.0722 49 70 0.0323 
CYM 30 1.65 6.83 -0.09 4.93 0.9376 26 50 0.4737 
CHL 30 3.21 4.77 -0.03 2.70 0.5591 37 61 0.4216 
CHN 30 6.60 3.18 -0.01 1.61 0.0434 50 71 0.0045 
COL 30 2.84 14.58 1.48 2.25 0.0022 58 77 -0.0002 
CRI 30 16.39 34.12 0.14 2.80 
 
68 88 0.0000 
HRV 30 1.64 20.39 -0.09 0.84 
 
69 89 0.0000 
CUW 30 1.65 6.83 -0.09 4.93 6.2874 11 35 4.2720 
CYP 136 1.49 1.95 -0.25 0.06 0.7070 33 24 -1.8958 
CZE 136 6.93 1.96 5.19 0.06 
 
70 30 -2.2524 
DNK 136 6.07 1.96 4.33 0.06 
 
71 7 -7.8569 
DOM 30 10.83 31.75 9.20 3.37 
 
72 90 0.0000 
ECU 30 1.65 5.18 -0.09 3.28 4.4718 12 26 1.9670 
EGY 30 1.66 4.17 -0.09 2.27 0.3923 41 55 0.0386 
GNQ 30 25.83 39.44 0.13 3.21 
 
73 91 0.0000 
EST 136 1.49 1.95 -0.25 0.06 7.1504 7 5 -1.7875 
FIN 136 5.42 1.95 3.67 0.05 
 
74 6 -8.4693 
FRA 136 4.66 3.29 2.93 1.33 
 
75 20 -2.9523 
GAB 30 16.01 6.23 -0.04 4.34 
 
76 92 0.0000 
DEU 136 6.92 3.20 5.15 1.21 
 
77 28 -2.4050 
GRC 136 10.20 1.96 8.46 0.06 
 
78 38 -1.9284 
GRN 30 1.65 6.82 -0.09 4.93 0.9492 23 47 0.4800 
HKG 30 1.66 4.48 -0.09 2.57 3.8422 13 36 1.8492 
HUN 136 1.49 1.96 -0.25 0.06 2.7294 15 10 -3.9657 
41 
 
ISL 136 8.14 1.95 6.39 0.06 
 
79 39 -1.9219 
IND 30 1.37 4.39 0.17 -3.93 0.5203 38 65 0.4437 
IDN 30 6.56 4.09 -0.04 2.03 0.0116 55 76 0.0083 
IRL 136 9.24 1.96 7.49 0.06 
 
80 18 -3.4337 
IMN 30 1.65 6.83 -0.09 4.93 0.9371 28 52 0.4735 
ISR 30 1.66 3.32 -0.09 1.42 2.7521 14 27 0.2979 
ITA 136 7.96 3.06 6.19 1.12 
 
81 41 -1.0840 
JAM 30 10.22 8.36 3.60 6.28 
 
82 93 0.0000 
JPN 30 1.63 5.97 -0.10 2.21 0.7054 34 64 0.6255 
JRY 30 1.65 6.82 -0.09 4.93 0.9488 24 48 0.4799 
JOR 30 1.65 13.87 -0.09 11.97 0.9799 21 44 0.0846 
KAZ 30 6.41 4.09 4.67 2.19 0.0335 51 72 -0.0028 
KOR 30 20.90 3.30 0.14 1.75 
 
83 94 0.0000 
KWT 30 1.63 17.49 -0.09 0.88 
 
84 95 0.0000 
LVA 136 1.49 1.95 -0.25 0.06 7.4413 5 4 -1.7546 
LBN 30 1.65 5.19 -0.09 3.29 0.0119 54 75 -0.0073 
LBY 30 1.65 11.49 -0.09 4.68 0.0187 52 96 0.0187 
LIE 30 1.65 5.15 -0.09 3.25 0.9546 22 45 0.2149 
LTU 136 8.49 1.95 6.75 0.06 
 
85 25 -2.5349 
LUX 136 2.46 1.95 0.91 0.06 
 
86 9 -6.9613 
MAC 30 1.65 17.98 -0.09 4.31 
 
87 97 0.0000 
MYS 30 1.66 3.02 -0.09 1.12 11.5940 3 13 6.5495 
MLT 136 1.49 1.95 0.01 0.06 7.0050 8 15 2.7234 
MUS 30 1.65 4.14 -0.09 2.24 2.2634 17 42 1.2334 
MEX 30 1.18 31.99 -0.09 0.65 
 
88 98 0.0000 
MNG 30 6.53 4.57 -0.08 2.51 
 
89 99 0.0000 
NAM 30 6.27 13.42 4.63 2.34 
 
90 100 0.0000 
NLD 136 3.93 1.96 2.18 0.04 0.0145 53 2 -11.2216 
NZL 30 1.65 7.58 -0.09 2.21 0.7875 31 62 0.6766 
NGA 30 8.64 5.90 0.08 -1.68 0.0032 57 83 0.0031 
NOR 136 11.33 1.96 9.58 0.06 
 
91 29 -2.2752 
OMN 30 11.49 4.44 -0.08 2.55 0.1416 44 67 0.0732 
PAK 30 6.31 32.85 -0.09 1.53 
 
92 101 0.0000 
PAN 30 5.59 5.39 -0.06 3.49 
 
93 78 -0.0001 
PER 30 6.09 11.41 0.16 3.55 
 
94 102 0.0000 
PHL 30 11.10 3.98 3.13 -3.89 
 
95 103 0.0000 
POL 136 7.63 1.96 5.87 0.06 
 
96 40 -1.5140 
PRT 136 7.73 1.96 6.06 0.06 
 
97 31 -2.2473 
PRI 30 15.94 6.82 0.14 4.94 
 
98 80 0.0000 
QAT 30 1.66 4.52 -0.09 2.62 7.3402 6 21 4.4281 
ROM 136 5.32 1.96 3.57 0.06 
 
99 17 -3.5319 
RUS 30 1.68 3.11 -0.09 1.18 2.0134 18 54 1.6489 
SAU 30 1.50 23.47 -0.09 1.94 
 
100 104 0.0000 
YUG 30 20.98 6.82 0.14 4.94 
 
101 105 0.0000 
SYC 30 1.65 6.63 -0.09 4.73 0.6670 35 59 0.4183 
SGP 30 1.66 2.95 -0.09 1.05 13.5305 2 11 6.9691 
42 
 
SVK 136 1.49 5.61 -0.25 3.71 0.8582 30 12 -5.3429 
SVN 136 7.11 1.95 5.36 0.06 
 
102 32 -2.0830 
ZAF 30 1.60 3.17 -0.09 1.27 2.6893 16 33 0.6113 
ESP 136 8.60 1.96 6.96 0.03 
 
103 16 -4.2069 
SUR 30 20.10 6.75 10.99 4.86 
 
104 106 0.0000 
SWE 136 5.26 1.96 3.51 0.05 
 
105 3 -9.8075 
CHE 136 6.53 1.95 4.78 0.04 
 
106 8 -6.9736 
TWN 30 6.59 5.20 -0.09 3.37 0.0001 59 81 0.0000 
THA 30 11.05 4.56 0.05 2.70 0.1622 43 68 0.1010 
TTO 30 6.27 4.21 4.54 2.15 0.0751 48 66 0.0036 
TUN 30 1.63 28.50 -0.08 2.08 
 
107 107 0.0000 
TUR 30 6.58 3.71 -0.09 1.85 0.1021 47 74 0.0828 
UKR 30 6.25 2.93 4.51 1.03 0.4064 40 57 0.0951 
ARE 30 1.66 3.04 -0.09 1.13 9.9919 4 14 5.4610 
GBR 136 1.54 2.02 -0.26 0.06 25.1064 1 1 10.3089 
USA 30 2.36 3.40 -0.13 0.86 1.3005 19 46 0.7039 
URY 30 6.30 5.18 4.58 3.29 0.2052 42 63 0.1143 
VEN 30 1.54 11.61 -0.09 0.28 0.7717 32 60 0.6046 
VIR 30 12.47 11.09 0.15 -6.86 
 
108 108 0.0000 





Annex B.3  Inclusive Framework standard rate 
 
CTR LINKS REPATRIATION TAX CENTRALIY 
 





1.46 4.83 -0.28 2.94 3.4310 17 69 3.3736 
DZA 
 
1.42 26.66 -0.28 2.20 
 
78 84 0.0000 
AGO 
 
10.94 33.38 0.13 2.06 
 
79 85 0.0000 
ARG 38 31.61 14.32 20.11 0.92 
 
80 86 0.0000 
ABW 2 11.22 4.83 4.62 2.94 0.0000 66 79 0.0000 
AUS 74 5.65 3.01 3.93 1.08 0.0009 63 34 -2.0395 
AUT 124 5.10 3.54 3.36 1.63 0.0142 51 37 -1.9776 
AZE 
 
6.39 4.82 -0.27 2.93 0.0288 46 73 -0.0027 
BHS 
 
1.46 4.83 -0.28 2.94 0.9595 32 53 0.4963 
BHR 54 1.40 4.76 -0.08 2.87 2.0510 23 43 1.1479 
BRB 58 15.60 4.83 13.85 2.93 0.0000 67 56 -0.3343 
BLR 2 1.46 4.84 -0.28 2.94 4.2996 12 58 4.0436 
BEL 136 3.47 4.79 1.84 2.88 
 
81 22 -2.8526 
BMU 6 1.46 4.83 -0.28 2.94 0.9603 30 51 0.4966 
BWA 20 8.50 4.83 0.13 -3.06 0.0000 75 82 0.0000 
BRA 60 11.09 9.14 -0.06 -3.27 
 
82 87 0.0000 
BRN 28 1.46 3.91 -0.28 2.01 3.3474 18 23 0.7206 
BGR 100 3.57 3.64 1.83 1.74 0.0774 41 19 -3.2237 
CAN 134 6.30 3.52 4.56 1.59 0.0004 65 70 -0.0394 
CYM 
 
1.46 4.83 -0.28 2.94 0.9605 29 50 0.4967 
CHL 62 6.02 3.32 2.77 1.24 
 
83 61 -0.1375 
CHN 136 6.54 3.97 -0.08 2.40 0.0015 62 71 -0.0375 
COL 22 5.85 9.82 4.49 -2.51 
 
84 77 -0.0025 
CRI 6 16.18 33.38 -0.07 2.06 
 
85 88 0.0000 
HRV 92 6.10 21.84 4.37 2.28 
 
86 89 0.0000 
CUW 6 1.46 4.83 -0.28 2.94 10.3917 3 35 8.3762 
CYP 82 1.34 4.16 -0.40 2.26 2.3258 22 24 -0.2769 
CZE 130 5.16 3.59 3.41 1.69 0.0097 52 30 -2.2426 
DNK 110 1.35 3.53 -0.40 1.62 2.4954 21 7 -5.3615 
DOM 4 10.81 30.52 9.18 2.14 
 
87 90 0.0000 
ECU 
 
1.46 4.84 -0.28 2.94 21.9259 2 26 19.4211 
EGY 82 1.45 8.36 -0.30 6.46 
 
88 55 -0.3537 
GNQ 
 
25.81 38.14 0.11 1.91 
 
89 91 0.0000 
EST 90 1.34 4.18 -0.40 2.28 3.8339 15 5 -5.1040 
FIN 112 3.56 3.16 1.82 1.26 
 
90 6 -8.4693 
FRA 140 1.29 2.80 -0.43 0.84 0.1843 36 20 -2.7679 
GAB 8 20.39 4.83 4.34 2.94 
 
91 92 0.0000 
DEU 122 3.74 3.79 1.97 1.80 0.0028 60 28 -2.4022 
GRC 92 5.17 4.17 3.43 2.26 0.0000 72 38 -1.9284 
GRN 
 
1.46 4.83 -0.28 2.94 0.9653 24 47 0.4961 
HKG 68 1.47 3.63 -0.28 1.72 6.6061 7 36 4.6130 
HUN 120 1.35 3.62 -0.40 1.72 3.2662 19 10 -3.4289 
44 
 
ISL 78 5.09 4.16 3.34 2.26 0.0019 61 39 -1.9201 
IND 126 1.34 4.35 0.15 -3.97 3.5460 16 65 3.4694 
IDN 96 11.18 4.15 4.59 2.10 0.0007 64 76 -0.0026 
IRL 118 3.44 3.61 1.69 1.70 0.0065 57 18 -3.4272 
IMN 18 1.46 4.83 -0.28 2.94 0.9113 33 52 0.4477 
ISR 90 10.06 3.75 8.32 1.84 
 
92 27 -2.4542 
ITA 128 5.25 4.51 3.48 2.56 
 
93 41 -1.0840 
JAM 30 19.30 18.09 12.69 16.02 
 
94 93 0.0000 
JPN 106 6.29 5.27 4.56 1.51 
 
95 64 -0.0799 
JRY 4 1.46 4.83 -0.28 2.94 0.9650 25 48 0.4960 
JOR 
 
1.46 4.84 -0.28 2.94 6.6889 6 44 5.7936 
KAZ 82 8.75 3.89 7.01 1.99 0.0000 74 72 -0.0363 
KOR 132 20.88 3.37 0.12 1.83 
 
96 94 0.0000 
KWT 64 1.44 17.91 -0.28 1.30 
 
97 95 0.0000 
LVA 92 1.34 2.86 -0.40 0.96 3.8585 13 4 -5.3375 
LBN 
 
1.46 4.84 -0.28 2.94 4.6451 10 75 4.6258 
LBY 
 
1.46 9.59 -0.28 2.79 0.1170 39 96 0.1170 
LIE 26 1.46 4.56 -0.28 2.66 0.9602 31 45 0.2205 
LTU 88 7.09 4.05 5.35 2.15 0.0000 73 25 -2.5348 
LUX 124 1.34 3.19 -0.20 1.29 0.0206 49 9 -6.9407 
MAC 4 1.46 16.26 -0.28 2.59 
 
98 97 0.0000 
MYS 100 1.45 3.68 -0.30 1.78 4.6192 11 13 -0.4253 
MLT 120 1.28 4.02 -0.20 2.13 7.0254 5 15 2.7437 
MUS 52 1.46 4.83 -0.28 2.93 0.9617 27 42 -0.0683 
MEX 118 5.57 32.11 4.30 0.77 
 
99 98 0.0000 
MNG 44 9.72 4.96 3.10 2.90 
 
100 99 0.0000 
NAM 
 
1.42 13.06 -0.22 1.98 
 
101 100 0.0000 
NLD 128 1.33 2.71 -0.41 0.79 3.8514 14 2 -7.3847 
NZL 70 12.31 3.29 10.57 -2.08 
 
102 62 -0.1109 
NGA 32 10.57 9.80 2.01 2.21 0.0000 76 83 0.0000 
NOR 118 5.03 3.13 3.28 1.23 0.0078 55 29 -2.2674 
OMN 46 11.32 3.88 -0.25 2.00 0.0279 47 67 -0.0404 
PAK 88 10.54 32.72 4.15 1.40 
 
103 101 0.0000 
PAN 32 11.15 4.81 5.50 2.91 0.0000 68 78 0.0000 
PER 16 6.06 10.09 0.14 2.23 0.0448 44 102 0.0448 
PHL 2 11.04 9.11 3.06 1.25 0.1493 38 103 0.1493 
POL 112 5.20 3.63 3.45 1.72 0.0034 59 40 -1.5106 
PRT 122 6.86 3.30 5.19 1.40 0.0000 77 31 -2.2473 
PRI 
 
15.92 4.82 0.12 2.94 0.0000 69 80 0.0000 
QAT 90 1.46 3.74 -0.28 1.84 6.2870 8 21 3.3749 
ROM 114 5.18 3.58 3.44 1.68 0.0372 45 17 -3.4947 
RUS 118 8.01 4.44 6.24 2.51 0.0094 53 54 -0.3551 
SAU 66 1.32 22.97 -0.28 1.43 
 
104 104 0.0000 
YUG 
 
20.96 4.82 0.11 2.94 
 
105 105 0.0000 
SYC 36 1.46 4.80 -0.28 2.90 0.0074 56 59 -0.2414 
SGP 128 1.47 3.64 -0.28 1.74 5.2154 9 11 -1.3459 
45 
 
SVK 106 1.34 8.03 -0.40 6.14 0.7043 34 12 -5.4968 
SVN 92 5.19 3.28 3.45 1.38 0.0000 70 32 -2.0830 
ZAF 116 6.27 3.73 4.58 1.83 0.0061 58 33 -2.0719 
ESP 138 1.31 3.26 -0.33 1.33 0.1810 37 16 -4.0259 
SUR 
 
8.85 4.83 -0.26 2.94 
 
106 106 0.0000 
SWE 124 1.35 2.80 -0.40 0.89 0.0241 48 3 -9.7834 
CHE 132 1.35 2.39 -0.40 0.48 0.0161 50 8 -6.9575 
TWN 
 
10.97 3.97 4.29 2.13 0.9623 26 81 0.9622 
THA 92 11.18 4.36 0.18 2.51 0.0916 40 68 0.0303 
TTO 32 10.01 4.83 8.28 2.77 0.0090 54 66 -0.0625 
TUN 72 6.18 28.63 4.48 2.20 
 
107 107 0.0000 
TUR 116 6.37 4.09 -0.30 2.23 0.0000 71 74 -0.0193 
UKR 106 6.19 4.70 4.44 2.81 0.0583 42 57 -0.2530 
ARE 110 1.47 3.58 -0.28 1.67 9.0803 4 14 4.5494 
GBR 144 1.38 2.88 -0.42 0.92 24.0462 1 1 9.2486 
USA 86 2.08 3.94 -0.41 1.40 0.6723 35 46 0.0756 
URY 36 7.84 4.82 6.12 2.92 0.0451 43 63 -0.0458 
VEN 2 1.40 12.36 -0.23 1.02 3.0969 20 60 2.9299 
VIR 
 
12.25 18.90 -0.07 0.95 
 
108 108 0.0000 








Annex B.4  EU wide prohibitive penalty 
 
 
CTR LINKS REPATRIATION TAX CENTRALIY 
 
MCNT SHOPOUT SHOPIN DIFOUT DIFIN VALUE RANK RANK 
REF 
DIFVAL 
ALB 30 6.69 3.28 4.95 1.38 0.0780 36 69 0.0206 
DZA 30 1.87 26.20 0.17 1.74 
 
55 84 0.0000 
AGO 30 10.96 34.87 0.15 3.55 
 
56 85 0.0000 
ARG 30 11.65 14.18 0.15 0.78 
 
57 86 0.0000 
ABW 30 11.44 6.85 4.85 4.96 0.0000 53 79 0.0000 
AUS 30 1.89 4.78 0.17 2.85 25.4835 2 34 23.4432 
AUT 136 6.85 2.09 5.10 0.18 
 
58 37 -1.9918 
AZE 30 8.50 3.83 1.85 1.93 0.0155 46 73 -0.0160 
BHS 30 1.91 6.96 0.17 5.06 0.6910 28 53 0.2278 
BHR 30 1.65 5.31 0.17 3.42 1.1389 15 43 0.2358 
BRB 30 1.91 5.48 0.17 3.58 1.0286 18 56 0.6943 
BLR 30 1.91 3.84 0.17 1.94 0.3144 31 58 0.0584 
BEL 136 5.05 3.35 3.42 1.44 
 
59 22 -2.8526 
BMU 30 1.91 6.96 0.17 5.06 0.6918 26 51 0.2281 
BWA 30 8.52 10.99 0.16 3.09 0.0000 50 82 0.0000 
BRA 30 11.30 14.07 0.16 1.65 
 
60 87 0.0000 
BRN 30 1.91 6.97 0.17 5.08 5.8044 6 23 3.1776 
BGR 136 7.43 2.08 5.69 0.18 
 
61 19 -3.3010 
CAN 30 6.51 3.91 4.76 1.97 0.0562 38 70 0.0164 
CYM 30 1.91 6.96 0.17 5.06 0.6920 25 50 0.2281 
CHL 30 3.47 5.19 0.22 3.12 0.6972 23 61 0.5598 
CHN 30 6.81 3.68 0.19 2.11 0.0418 41 71 0.0029 
COL 30 2.96 14.87 1.60 2.54 0.0014 48 77 -0.0011 
CRI 30 16.39 34.21 0.14 2.89 
 
62 88 0.0000 
HRV 30 1.90 20.50 0.17 0.94 
 
63 89 0.0000 
CUW 30 1.91 6.96 0.17 5.06 4.0232 9 35 2.0078 
CYP 136 18.31 2.08 16.57 0.18 
 
64 24 -2.6027 
CZE 136 6.95 2.09 5.20 0.18 
 
65 30 -2.2524 
DNK 136 6.09 1.96 4.35 0.06 
 
66 7 -7.8569 
DOM 30 10.83 31.85 9.20 3.46 
 
67 90 0.0000 
ECU 30 1.91 5.45 0.17 3.55 6.3993 5 26 3.8945 
EGY 30 1.92 5.12 0.17 3.21 1.0551 16 55 0.7013 
GNQ 30 25.83 39.52 0.13 3.29 
 
68 91 0.0000 
EST 136 3.56 1.95 1.82 0.06 
 
69 5 -8.9379 
FIN 136 5.44 2.08 3.70 0.18 
 
70 6 -8.4693 
FRA 136 4.67 3.42 2.94 1.46 
 
71 20 -2.9523 
GAB 30 19.71 6.36 3.65 4.47 
 
72 92 0.0000 
DEU 136 6.94 3.33 5.17 1.34 
 
73 28 -2.4050 
GRC 136 10.23 2.09 8.48 0.18 
 
74 38 -1.9284 
GRN 30 1.91 6.95 0.17 5.06 0.7122 21 47 0.2430 
HKG 30 1.92 4.61 0.17 2.70 5.2732 8 36 3.2801 
47 
 
HUN 136 6.54 2.08 4.79 0.18 
 
75 10 -6.6951 
ISL 136 8.24 2.08 6.49 0.18 
 
76 39 -1.9219 
IND 30 1.37 9.67 0.17 1.35 0.1671 34 65 0.0905 
IDN 30 6.76 4.52 0.16 2.46 0.0153 47 76 0.0120 
IRL 136 9.27 2.09 7.52 0.18 
 
77 18 -3.4337 
IMN 30 1.91 6.96 0.17 5.06 0.6916 27 52 0.2280 
ISR 30 6.63 3.33 4.88 1.43 0.2864 32 27 -2.1678 
ITA 136 8.04 3.19 6.27 1.25 
 
78 41 -1.0840 
JAM 30 10.38 9.79 3.76 7.72 
 
79 93 0.0000 
JPN 30 1.91 6.12 0.18 2.36 0.6880 29 64 0.6081 
JRY 30 1.91 6.95 0.17 5.06 0.7119 22 48 0.2429 
JOR 30 1.91 15.21 0.17 13.31 0.9795 19 44 0.0842 
KAZ 30 6.73 4.26 4.99 2.36 0.0182 45 72 -0.0181 
KOR 30 20.90 3.57 0.14 2.03 
 
80 94 0.0000 
KWT 30 1.89 17.60 0.17 0.98 
 
81 95 0.0000 
LVA 136 5.15 2.08 3.40 0.18 
 
82 4 -9.1960 
LBN 30 1.91 7.35 0.17 5.45 0.0247 44 75 0.0054 
LBY 30 1.91 14.46 0.17 7.65 0.0520 39 96 0.0520 
LIE 30 1.91 5.27 0.17 3.38 0.7262 20 45 -0.0135 
LTU 136 8.73 2.08 6.99 0.18 
 
83 25 -2.5349 
LUX 136 2.56 2.08 1.01 0.18 
 
84 9 -6.9613 
MAC 30 1.91 18.09 0.17 4.42 
 
85 97 0.0000 
MYS 30 1.92 3.15 0.17 1.25 26.3808 1 13 21.3363 
MLT 136 17.54 1.95 16.06 0.06 
 
86 15 -4.2817 
MUS 30 1.91 4.27 0.17 2.37 2.7708 11 42 1.7407 
MEX 30 1.44 32.09 0.17 0.74 
 
87 98 0.0000 
MNG 30 6.78 6.67 0.16 4.61 
 
88 99 0.0000 
NAM 30 6.45 15.70 4.81 4.62 
 
89 100 0.0000 
NLD 136 3.95 2.08 2.20 0.17 
 
90 2 -11.2361 
NZL 30 1.91 7.91 0.17 2.53 2.4641 12 62 2.3533 
NGA 30 8.72 10.63 0.16 3.05 0.0000 51 83 0.0000 
NOR 136 11.35 2.09 9.60 0.18 
 
91 29 -2.2752 
OMN 30 11.72 4.57 0.15 2.68 0.0276 42 67 -0.0407 
PAK 30 6.55 32.94 0.16 1.62 
 
92 101 0.0000 
PAN 30 5.81 5.52 0.16 3.62 0.0000 52 78 0.0000 
PER 30 6.09 11.80 0.16 3.94 
 
93 102 0.0000 
PHL 30 11.26 9.04 3.28 1.18 
 
94 103 0.0000 
POL 136 7.64 2.09 5.89 0.19 
 
95 40 -1.5140 
PRT 136 7.82 2.09 6.15 0.18 
 
96 31 -2.2473 
PRI 30 15.94 6.95 0.14 5.07 0.0000 54 80 0.0000 
QAT 30 1.91 4.65 0.17 2.75 5.3253 7 21 2.4132 
ROM 136 7.06 2.09 5.31 0.18 
 
97 17 -3.5319 
RUS 30 1.94 3.25 0.17 1.32 2.2885 13 54 1.9240 
SAU 30 1.76 23.58 0.17 2.05 
 
98 104 0.0000 
YUG 30 20.98 6.96 0.14 5.08 
 
99 105 0.0000 
SYC 30 1.91 6.76 0.17 4.86 1.0493 17 59 0.8005 
48 
 
SGP 30 1.92 3.08 0.17 1.18 13.0327 3 11 6.4713 
SVK 136 3.07 5.61 1.33 3.71 
 
100 12 -6.2010 
SVN 136 7.21 2.08 5.47 0.18 
 
101 32 -2.0830 
ZAF 30 1.86 3.31 0.17 1.41 2.9203 10 33 0.8423 
ESP 136 8.62 2.09 6.98 0.16 
 
102 16 -4.2069 
SUR 30 20.42 6.88 11.31 4.98 
 
103 106 0.0000 
SWE 136 5.28 1.96 3.53 0.05 
 
104 3 -9.8075 
CHE 136 6.55 2.08 4.79 0.17 
 
105 8 -6.9736 
TWN 30 6.84 5.36 0.16 3.53 0.0001 49 81 0.0001 
THA 30 11.15 4.69 0.15 2.83 0.0488 40 68 -0.0124 
TTO 30 9.78 4.75 8.06 2.69 0.0894 35 66 0.0180 
TUN 30 1.87 28.60 0.17 2.17 
 
106 107 0.0000 
TUR 30 6.83 3.84 0.16 1.98 0.0255 43 74 0.0062 
UKR 30 6.57 3.08 4.83 1.18 0.2797 33 57 -0.0316 
ARE 30 1.92 3.17 0.17 1.26 9.4399 4 14 4.9090 
GBR 136 3.41 2.16 1.61 0.19 
 
107 1 -14.7976 
USA 30 2.73 3.58 0.24 1.04 1.7971 14 46 1.2004 
URY 30 6.36 5.32 4.65 3.43 0.0700 37 63 -0.0209 
VEN 30 1.80 11.90 0.17 0.56 0.6528 30 60 0.4858 
VIR 30 12.47 19.83 0.15 1.88 
 
108 108 0.0000 
VGB 30 1.91 6.96 0.17 5.06 0.6925 24 49 0.2283 
49 
 
Annex B.5  OECD – IF prohibitive penalty 
 
CTR LINKS REPATRIATION TAX CENTRALIY 
 
MCNT SHOPOUT SHOPIN DIFOUT DIFIN VALUE RANK RANK 
REF 
DIFVAL 
ALB 68 11.20 14.14 9.46 12.25 0.07 27 69 0.01 
DZA 68 10.15 34.43 8.45 9.96 
 
51 84 0.00 
AGO 68 11.02 42.57 0.21 11.25 
 
52 85 0.00 
ARG 74 31.63 18.98 20.14 5.58 
 
53 86 0.00 
ABW 68 24.79 17.84 18.20 15.94 0.00 45 79 0.00 
AUS 214 9.07 7.16 7.35 5.23 
 
54 34 -2.04 
AUT 214 6.85 5.57 5.10 3.67 
 
55 37 -1.99 
AZE 68 9.67 14.41 3.02 12.52 0.01 35 73 -0.02 
BHS 68 16.81 17.95 15.07 16.05 0.40 11 53 -0.06 
BHR 94 16.49 16.20 15.01 14.30 0.37 13 43 -0.53 
BRB 94 25.22 9.87 23.48 7.97 0.00 48 56 -0.33 
BLR 70 8.70 14.71 6.95 12.81 0.43 7 58 0.17 
BEL 214 5.05 5.12 3.42 3.21 
 
56 22 -2.85 
BMU 74 16.81 17.95 15.07 16.05 0.37 14 51 -0.10 
BWA 80 8.58 19.01 0.21 11.11 0.00 43 82 0.00 
BRA 84 14.22 19.24 3.07 6.83 
 
57 87 0.00 
BRN 88 2.56 16.95 0.82 15.05 0.38 12 23 -2.25 
BGR 110 4.56 5.53 2.82 3.63 0.02 33 19 -3.28 
CAN 214 8.59 7.82 6.85 5.88 
 
58 70 -0.04 
CYM 68 16.81 17.95 15.07 16.05 0.40 10 50 -0.06 
CHL 214 22.12 15.34 18.87 13.27 
 
59 61 -0.14 
CHN 136 9.62 8.55 3.01 6.98 0.00 40 71 -0.04 
COL 72 5.94 20.52 4.58 8.19 
 
60 77 0.00 
CRI 68 28.70 41.90 12.45 10.58 
 
61 88 0.00 
HRV 102 9.52 28.90 7.79 9.34 
 
62 89 0.00 
CUW 70 2.27 17.95 0.53 16.05 2.22 2 35 0.21 
CYP 104 11.98 6.46 10.24 4.56 0.16 22 24 -2.44 
CZE 214 6.95 5.50 5.20 3.60 
 
63 30 -2.25 
DNK 214 6.09 4.31 4.35 2.40 
 
64 7 -7.86 
DOM 68 10.89 39.77 9.26 11.38 
 
65 90 0.00 
ECU 68 2.17 15.84 0.43 13.94 3.00 1 26 0.50 
EGY 106 6.82 12.05 5.07 10.14 
 
66 55 -0.35 
GNQ 68 25.87 46.66 0.17 10.43 
 
67 91 0.00 
EST 214 3.56 7.24 1.82 5.34 
 
68 5 -8.94 
FIN 214 5.44 4.05 3.70 2.15 
 
69 6 -8.47 
FRA 214 4.67 4.49 2.94 2.53 
 
70 20 -2.95 
GAB 68 20.42 17.14 4.37 15.25 
 
71 92 0.00 
DEU 214 6.94 4.43 5.17 2.44 
 
72 28 -2.41 
GRC 214 10.23 13.63 8.48 11.73 
 
73 38 -1.93 
GRN 68 16.81 17.94 15.07 16.04 0.40 8 47 -0.07 
HKG 100 16.81 13.98 15.06 12.08 0.74 4 36 -1.25 
HUN 214 6.54 6.56 4.79 4.66 
 
74 10 -6.70 
50 
 
ISL 214 8.24 7.31 6.49 5.42 
 
75 39 -1.92 
IND 128 1.43 12.68 0.24 4.35 0.03 31 65 -0.05 
IDN 110 11.61 8.98 5.02 6.93 0.01 38 76 0.00 
IRL 214 9.27 5.79 7.52 3.89 
 
76 18 -3.43 
IMN 78 16.81 17.95 15.07 16.05 0.32 17 52 -0.14 
ISR 214 12.58 9.92 10.83 8.01 
 
77 27 -2.45 
ITA 214 8.04 7.42 6.27 5.48 
 
78 41 -1.08 
JAM 74 19.33 19.62 12.71 17.55 
 
79 93 0.00 
JPN 214 6.36 8.58 4.64 4.82 
 
80 64 -0.08 
JRY 72 16.81 17.94 15.07 16.04 0.36 15 48 -0.11 
JOR 68 2.29 27.26 0.54 25.36 0.74 5 44 -0.16 
KAZ 100 8.79 7.42 7.05 5.52 0.00 50 72 -0.04 
KOR 214 21.01 8.03 0.25 6.49 
 
81 94 0.00 
KWT 102 2.53 25.51 0.80 8.89 
 
82 95 0.00 
LVA 98 2.25 4.68 0.51 2.78 0.31 19 4 -8.89 
LBN 68 21.48 22.67 19.73 20.77 0.11 25 75 0.09 
LBY 68 2.44 29.36 0.70 22.56 0.05 29 96 0.05 
LIE 78 16.75 16.26 15.01 14.36 0.25 21 45 -0.49 
LTU 96 7.81 5.95 6.07 4.05 0.00 49 25 -2.53 
LUX 214 2.56 5.65 1.01 3.75 
 
83 9 -6.96 
MAC 68 16.76 27.76 15.02 14.09 
 
84 97 0.00 
MYS 116 1.96 12.22 0.21 10.32 0.12 24 13 -4.92 
MLT 126 11.72 5.96 10.24 4.06 0.05 28 15 -4.23 
MUS 106 16.75 15.23 15.01 13.33 0.13 23 42 -0.90 
MEX 214 6.74 32.87 5.48 1.52 
 
85 98 0.00 
MNG 86 14.72 24.76 8.11 22.69 
 
86 99 0.00 
NAM 68 9.42 32.25 7.77 21.17 
 
87 100 0.00 
NLD 214 3.95 3.23 2.20 1.31 
 
88 2 -11.24 
NZL 214 13.28 10.63 11.54 5.26 
 
89 62 -0.11 
NGA 82 10.65 18.45 2.09 10.87 0.00 42 83 0.00 
NOR 214 11.35 8.64 9.60 6.73 
 
90 29 -2.28 
OMN 90 11.90 14.08 0.33 12.19 0.02 32 67 -0.05 
PAK 112 11.70 37.08 5.31 5.76 
 
91 101 0.00 
PAN 76 24.65 16.35 19.00 14.45 0.00 47 78 0.00 
PER 72 6.15 19.80 0.22 11.94 
 
92 102 0.00 
PHL 68 15.48 13.36 7.50 5.49 
 
93 103 0.00 
POL 214 7.64 6.46 5.89 4.55 
 
94 40 -1.51 
PRT 214 7.82 6.58 6.15 4.68 
 
95 31 -2.25 
PRI 68 15.99 17.95 0.20 16.07 0.00 46 80 0.00 
QAT 118 3.23 14.47 1.48 12.57 0.28 20 21 -2.63 
ROM 120 5.68 6.49 3.93 4.59 0.02 34 17 -3.52 
RUS 120 8.48 6.62 6.71 4.69 0.00 41 54 -0.36 
SAU 96 5.17 31.35 3.57 9.82 
 
96 104 0.00 
YUG 68 21.03 17.95 0.19 16.08 
 
97 105 0.00 
SYC 100 24.21 17.74 22.47 15.85 0.01 39 59 -0.24 
SGP 136 2.17 12.29 0.43 10.38 0.31 18 11 -6.25 
51 
 
SVK 214 3.07 12.85 1.33 10.95 
 
98 12 -6.20 
SVN 214 7.21 6.15 5.47 4.25 
 
99 32 -2.08 
ZAF 122 6.72 5.79 5.03 3.88 0.33 16 33 -1.75 
ESP 214 8.62 7.15 6.98 5.22 
 
100 16 -4.21 
SUR 68 25.25 17.87 16.14 15.97 
 
101 106 0.00 
SWE 214 5.28 3.70 3.53 1.79 
 
102 3 -9.81 
CHE 214 6.55 4.09 4.80 2.18 
 
103 8 -6.97 
TWN 68 15.33 14.82 8.66 12.99 0.00 44 81 0.00 
THA 102 11.39 9.55 0.39 7.70 0.08 26 68 0.02 
TTO 78 10.09 15.20 8.36 13.14 0.01 36 66 -0.06 
TUN 94 6.38 33.62 4.67 7.20 
 
104 107 0.00 
TUR 214 13.29 11.09 6.62 9.23 
 
105 74 -0.02 
UKR 112 7.65 7.01 5.90 5.11 0.03 30 57 -0.28 
ARE 126 3.23 12.44 1.48 10.53 1.31 3 14 -3.22 
GBR 214 3.41 3.49 1.61 1.52 
 
106 1 -14.80 
USA 214 10.73 6.49 8.25 3.95 
 
107 46 -0.60 
URY 80 7.92 16.23 6.20 14.34 0.01 37 63 -0.08 
VEN 68 8.95 14.14 7.33 2.80 0.67 6 60 0.50 
VIR 68 25.67 23.42 13.35 5.48 
 
108 108 0.00 






Annex C: Double counting of flows 
The network approach computes the optimal routes. Once these have been determined, we also 
know the use of each individual link in the network. Link use combines the direct use of a link for a 
given pair of countries and its possible treaty shopping use. It must be observed that indirect routing 
leads to some double counting of flows. Consider the repatriation of 100 units from source 
jurisdiction A to residence country B; the total outgoing flow is 100, as is the total incoming flow. 
Now consider a diversion of 40% through a conduit country C, see figure C.1. By adding the outgoing 
flows over all countries a total of 140 is found whereas only a 100 left country A and arrived in B.  
 
Figure C.1: Double counting of flows; out = 60 + 40 + 40 = 140 = in 
 
 
Similar double counting occurs in the case of re-exports. Also the statistics of Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI), based on reporting of the immediate countries of origin and destination, suffer 
from inflation of size by double counting.  
 
In the 2018 baseline we find an overall factor of double counting of 291. This is like an index where 
100 is the size of the flows without diversion. Hence in the baseline the diversion is almost two times 
(200%) of the initial undiverted flows. In the last scenario (Strong) the double counting factor is 114; 
only 14% diversion. 
 
Table C.1: Policy scenarios and the Double Counting Index 
 Scenario Double Counting Index   
0. Baseline 2018 292   
1. Denmark unilateral 291   
2. EU-wide 249   
3. Inclusive Framework  256   
4. EU-wide (p.p.) 249   
5. OECD-IF (Strong) 114   
 
The diversion of flows for optimal routes can be seen as an indicator for the size of the market for 
conduit services. We observe that over the set of scenarios, with more countries and treaties 
included, the double counting index rapidly falls. Especially in the last scenario there are far less 
flows diverted, suggesting a small market for conduit services. Nevertheless, the question is still 
whether countries and in particular the remaining conduit countries have an incentive to refrain 
from the benefits of being a conduit country. If many treaty shopping routes are not beneficial any 
longer these benefits will erode and it could become easier to join the OECD and Inclusive 
Framework on BEPS programme. On the other hand, countries could also choose to lower their 
withholding taxes as a way of becoming more attractive as conduit countries. 
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